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STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR 



Who wanted war? 

The origin of the war 
according to diplomatic documents 

by 

L. DURKHEIM and E. DENIS 
Professors in the University of Paris 



Translated 

by 

A. M. W1LSON-GAR1NEI 

L»te student of Ncwnham College Cambridge, Modem Languages Tripoi 




LIBRAIRIE ARMAND COLIN 

I03, Boulevard Salnt-Mlchel, PARIS, 5* 



Price : franc 50 



STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR 

PUBLISHING COiMMITTEE 



MM. ERNEST LAVISSE.oitne, Academe francaise,,/^,,, 

Cha* les AND, ER, professor of German literature and 
language in the University of Paris. 

W„ BEDIER, professor a, ,he . College de France . 
He™ BERGSON, of the . Academic francaise '. 
Em, LE BOUTROUX, of the « Academic francaise , 

E of plnf N,S ' Pr0feSS ° r ° f hiS, ° ry iD '^ Uni ^ *Y 
EMt, E DURKHEIM, professor in the University of Paris 
Jacquss HADAMARD, of the « Academic des Sciences »' 

Gustxv. LANSON, professor of French literature in the 

University of Paris. 

Charles SEIGNOBOS, professor of history in the Uni 
versity of Paris. * Um 

A NDRE WEISS, of the i Academie des Sciences morales 
et pohtiques ». 



SYNDICAT DES EDITEURS 
(Decision du 27 Juin 1917) 



A partir du 1" Aout 1917 
Augmentation temporaire 
de 20 °/» du prix marque 

LibiUirie Armand Colin 



STL DinS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR 



Who wanted war ? 

The origin of the war 
according to diplomatic documents 

by 

E. DURKHEIM and E. DENIS 

Professors at the University of Paris 



translated 



by 

A. M. WILS0N-GARINE1 

iuie S:uJ;a: of Newnham College Cambridge, Modern Languages Tripos 




LIBRAIRIE ARMAND COLIN 

103, Boulcv.ird Salnt-MIchol, PARIS, 5« 






^V" 



r>» of w* 

SEP, 24 ]9] g 



WHO WANTED WAR? 



Like all historical events, the present war depends, in some 
measure, on causes of a profound and remote nature. Historians 
will one day have to investigate the demographic, economic 
and ethnic conditions owing to which occasions for conflict 
seemed, for some lime, to have been multiplying among the 
peoples; how Hie precarious state of the Austro -Hungarian 
Empire, the development of the Balkan peoples, the clearer 
self-consciousness to which certain nationalities were awakening, 
were bound, in a future more or less imminent, to determine the 
reconstruction of the map of Europe; finally, how from all 
this there resulted a feeling of unrest and anxiety which prepared 
the minds of men for war. 

But whatever may be the importance of these impersonal 
causes, they cannot act by themselves ; they can on\y produce 
their effect through the will of man. When war breaks out, 
it is because some Slate wishes for war and that State must 
hear the responsibility. If during the last ten years we passed 
through very serious crises — the Conference of Algeeiras. the 
iiT.iirs of Casablanca and of Agadir, the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Balkan Wars — and no European war 
resulted from them, it was not because Hie moral situation of 
Europe was more satisfactory than it is to-day, but because 
men desirous of peace succeeded in averting the danger, li 
this timn Uk> catastrophe has taken place, it means that these 
men, or certain among them, have changed their opinion. And 
therefore the question presents itself: where has this change 
beenproduced? Which nation wished for war in preference i" 
peace and what was iis reason for preferring it? 

Hi- this question that we propose to discuss. It forces itseli 



4 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

so naturally upon our attention that each of us has, most 
likely, already answered it in his own way. But until lately it 
was difficult for us to have on this point an enlightened and 
well thoughtout opinion ; our information was too fragmentary 
to enable us to view the crisis as a whole, and to follow it during 
the course of its development. To-day we have at our disposal 
several collections of diplomatic documents which, emanating 
from different governments, complete and mutually check one 
another ( i). Though they probably do not reveal all the secrets of 
the chancelleries yet they permit us at least to trace, step by 
step, the series of negotiations which took place during that 
week of terrible suspense when the fate of Europe was at 
stake. We can now distinguish the successive periods and 
enquire at each stage what was done for peace and what against 
it, whence came the attempts at conciliation and whence a tacit 
or avowed resistance. Our inventory made, we can establish 
the moral balance-sheet of the different actors in the drama 
and thus determine the share of responsibility that falls to each 
of them. Such is the object and such is the plan of the study 
we are about to make. 

This study is all the more necessary as the German Govern- 
ment has already taken up the question and has professed to 
solve it by means of documents exclusively German. The solu- 
tion which the German Government gives of it is set forth in 
the Preface to the White Book; according to it, Russia is 
responsible for the war. We cannot leave unanswered an 
allegation which has been so widely circulated. Yet, though Ave 
feel we ought to mention it at the very beginning of this work, 
we do not intend to take it expressly to task nor to discuss it 
in itself. To prove its worth, it is sufficient to state the facts 

(1) We have five collections of this kind; the Russian book, known as (he 
Orange Book (0. B.), the French book or Yellow Book (Y. B.), the Belgian 
book or Grt.v Book (G. B.), the German book or White Book (W. B.) and the 
book published by the British Governement under the title Correspondence 
respecting the European Crisis (B. Cor.). When our work was in the press 
the Servian book appeared but it adds nothing of importancs to the pre- 
ceding. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 5 

simply and honestly in the order that they come, contenting 
ourselves "with pointing out on the way, what these facts have 
become in the German reading of them. Once these statements are 
given — reference to them will be found in the foot-notes (i) — 
the conclusion will be evident in itself. 

But whilst entering upon the subject of this work, Ave must 
not forget that we ourselves are judge and a party in the 
debate since our own country is concerned. We, and our 
readers in particular, must therefore be on guard against the 
possible influence of a national partiality, however natural 
it may be. For that reason we shall restrict ourselves to 
giving first a complete and objective account of events, 
without making any comment. We shall then allow ourselves 
to draw our conclusions, but by that time it witl be easy for the 
reader to check, by the narrative which has gone before, the 
result at which we shall have arrived. 



(!) To draw the reader's attention to these notes we have printed ihera 
in italics. 



/. — The Austrian Ultimatum and Servia's Reply* 
(July 23 rd — 25 th ) 

On the 28 th of June 19 14, at Serajevo, the administrative capita! 
of Bosnia, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir presump- 
tive to the throne of Austria-Hungary and his wife the Duchess 
of Hohenberg, were assassinated. This double crime was the 
starting-point of the war. 

The assassins were manifestly conspirators who wished 
to protest by this act against the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by Austria, and to prepare the way for the reunion 
of these provinces with Servia. For this reason Austria at once 
declared it to be evident, that the origin of this plot must be 
sought in Belgrade, and that it had been organised, if not by 
the Servian Government, at least by societies which the Govern- 
ment had wrongfully tolerated and even protected. The enquiry 
ordered by the Austrian Government was conducted in this spirit 
and it was easy to foretell the result. Scarcely had it begun when 
the unofficial press announced that "steps" of a threatening 
character were about to be taken to force Servia to cease its 
criminal machinations. Already on the 2nd of July the French 
Ambassador, M. Dumaine, warned his Government that the 
situation gave him cause for anxiety (1). But as if by word of 
command, when the moment approached for the result of the 
enquiry to be published, the tone changed. Instead of "steps 
are about to be taken" we find " negotiations are about to take 
place". Count Tisza made a speech in the Austrian Parliament, 
the moderation of which went so far as to exasperate certain 
newspapers (2). Optimism became the leading note in the official 
press. On the 23rd of July Baron Macchio, general secretary oi 

(1) Y. B., n> 8. 

(2) Y. B., nos 11 and 12. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 7 

the Austrian Foreign Office, again assured M. Dumaine that 
"a pacific conclusion could be counted on" t). 

On that very day Austria had her Ultimatum sent to Bel- 
grade. 

The bellicose nature of the Austrian Ultimatum. — This ulti- 
matum is so well-known that it is not necessary to reproduce 
it here ; we shall merely recall to the reader's mind its essential 
articles. 

The Austrian Government, considering as an established fact 
that the Serajevo assassinations had been planned in Belgrade, 
demanded that the Servian Government should take certain 
measures to prevent a repetition of similar outrages. 

First of all the Servian Government was to publish a decla- 
ration on the first page of the Official Journal of the a6th July, 
the form of which Avas strictly dictated, by which it con- 
demned all propaganda against Austria-Hungary, expressed its 
regrets that public officials should have participated in such 
propaganda and promised henceforward to punish severely all 
persons found guilty of similar acts. This declaration was also 
to be communicated to the arm v. 

Moreover it had to pledge itself: 

i. To suppress any publication directed against Austria. 

3. To dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana, accused 
in particular of engaging in active propaganda against the 
Austro-IIungarian Monarchy, to confiscate its means of action 
anil to proceed in the same manner against all societies which 
might be formed in future for similar purposes. 

3. To eliminate from the state schools all persons and all 
diods of instruction that might facilitate the above-mentioned 
propaganda. 

't. To remove from the army and from the administration all 
those officers and officials whom the Austrian Government 
should indicate as being guilty in this way. 

(!) Y. /?., n i 20. 



8 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

5. To accept the collaboration of representatives of the Royal 
and Imperial Government in the "suppression" of this subver- 
sive movement. 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the 
Serajevo plot in Servian territory; "delegates of the Austro- 
llungarian Government will take part in the investigation 
relating thereto". 

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of two Servian 
subjects accused in particular of being implicated in the plot 

8. To prevent the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across 
the frontier and to punish the officials who had permitted or 
facilitated such traffic. 

9. To furnish the Dual Monarchy with explanations regarding 
the hostile utterances of high Servian officials both in Servia 
and abroad. 

10. To notify the Austrian Government of the execution of 
the measures above-mentioned. 

Servia was given forty-eight hours in which to make known 
her reply. 

No sooner had the ultimatum been published, than the unanim- 
ous opinion of the chancelleries was that it had been conceived 
and drawn up " so as to render war inevitable". Sir M. de 
Bunsen, English Ambassador at Vienna says : " I have 
had conversations with all my colleagues representing the 
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is... that the 
Austro-Ilungarian Government is fully resolved to have war 
with Servia (1)." The Austrian demands were in fact of such 
a kind that no State could submit to them without sacrificing 
its entire independence. Not only was Servia deeply humiliated 
by having to make a public apology in terms which she was 
not even allowed to discuss, but further, her sovereignty 
was infringed by the intervention of foreign officials in a 
judicial enquiry and in her administrative action ; she was 
treated as the vassal of Austria. The very tone of the note seemed 

(.1) B. Got., no 41. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 9 

intended to offend the Stale to which it was addressed and thus 
to make submission more difficult. What could be more offensive 
than the brevity of the delay granted Scrvia for reflexion? It 
Avas to lay down as a principle that the result of the Austrian 
enquiry although that enquiry had been one-sided and singu- 
larly summary, allowed of no discussion (i). 

Moreover, the date chosen, the proceedings adopted, every- 
thing tended to prove that the object was to prevent any 
intervention in favour of peace. The optimism professed by 
the Austrian official papers at the last moment, and which 
events were so soon to belie, had managed to lull the mistrust 
even of those States most interested in following the matter 
closely. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna had just gone on 
leave, after receiving formal assurances that all would be well(2). 
President Poincare, accompanied by M. Viviani, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, was visiting the northern capitals (3). The 
French Minister was absent from Belgrade on account of illness. 
The diplomatists of the Triple Entente could not therefore 
easily take concerted action in order to intervene between the 
two adversaries. Besides, they were not given the time. The 
Ultimatum was not communicated to the Powers until the 
a^th of July, the day after it had been sent to Belgrade. They 
therefore had little more than twenty-four hours in which to 
prevent the rupture. 

This bellicose attitude was. moreover, acclaimed by a large 
section of public opinion. War was desired and the moment 
was judged favourable. " If we do not make up our minds to 
go to war now " wrote the Militdrische Rundschau, " we shall 
have to do so in two or three years' time, and under much 
less favourable conditions. As we shall be obliged to accept 
the struggle one day, let us provoke it at once". And the Neue 
fireie Presse was indignant at the very thought of attempting a 

(1) Wo leave r-ntirely on one side the q estion of the value of Austria's 
allegations; they have too little influence on the course of events. 

(2) }'. //., no 18. 

(3) Y. D., no 25. 



10 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

pacific arrangement. It considered that a peaceful settlement 
could follow only " a war to the knife against pan-Serbism "(1). 
Thus, once the Ultimatum had been sent, the only fear was 
that Servia might yield (2). On the 26th of July Sir M. Bunsen 
writes ; " The language- of the press leaves the impression that 
the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really de- 
sired (3). " 

Now war with Servia was the open door to a European war. 
It would certainly be unjust to say that everyone in Vienna had 
deliberately wished for this extension of the conflict. We 
are assured that Count Berchtold and his circle would have 
been content with " localised operations against Servia ". But on 
the other hand a whole faction deemed it necessary" to make a 
move before Russia had completed the great improvements she 
was making in her army and her railways, and before France 
had brought her military organisation to perfection » (4). In any 
case, even the most moderate must have been aware that it 
might not be possible to limit the war area once war had broken 
out. 

The Ultimatum was known to Germany. — Was' the 
heavy responsibility thus assumed by Austria shared by Ger- 
many ? Did she know of the ultimatum before its publication, 
and did she encourage her ally to run the risk? 

TheChancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and theSecretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, have always main- 
tained that they were totally ignorant of the Austrian demands 
before they were communicated to Belgrade, and that if they 
approved of them without reserve, yet they could not be held 
responsible for them. 

But these repeated affirmations were generally looked on with 
scepticism and unbelief. It seemed incredible that Germany 
could support the Austrian pretensions and with what energy , 

(1) Y. B., no 12. 

(2) Y. B., no 27. 

(3) B. Oor., no 20. 

(4) Y. B. t no 14. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS It 

we shall see. if she had been ignorant of their importer ). It seemed 
as improbable that Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador 
at Vienna, already a party to violent resolutions, should have 
been held in ignorance of what was being schemed. In fact. Sir 
ML tie Bunsen declares that he had " private information that 
the German Ambassador kneiv the text of the Austrian ultimatum 
10 Servia before it ivas despatched, and telegraphed it to the 
German Emperor " (2). 

Moreover we have to-day a whole collection of evidence which 
confirms this presumption. 

There exists in Germany a measure preparatory to mobilisa- 
tion, which consists in informing men and officers in the reserve 
to hold themselves ready in case of a speedy call to arms. This 
is according to M. Cambon, "a general alert " (un garde a 
vous general) which is resorted to in moments of tension. This 
notice had been issued in 191 1 during the negotiations relative 
to Morocco (3). Now, from the 21st of July, 1914, Mr Cambon 
\\ ts informed that this preliminary notice of mobilisation had 
been adressed " to the classes that should receive it in a similar 
case " {'4). It was at this very moment that Austria set to work 
to reassure Europe. We must believe that Germany, too. was 
informed of what was in preparation. 

At about the same time (23rd of July), the Bavarian Prime 
Minister, whilst discussing the Austro-Servian incident with our 
Minister atMunich, was led to say that he "had knowledge "of the 
Austrian note (5). Now. at that date Servia had not yet received 
it. and it was only made known to the Powers on the -.>'jih. How 
can we admit that Austria could have been silent to Germany 
on what she had thought it her duty to confide to Bavaria: 1 (6) 

(t) }'. D., no 30. 

(2) h. Cor., no 95. 

(3) )'. B., no 3. 

(4) )'. Ft., no 15. 
)'. H., no 21. 

(6) The Bavarian Government though 1 !i ( later to deny this eta tern Qt;btrt 
Its author, M Alii/-, maintains ii integrally. Perhaps the Bavarian Govern- 
ment plays on the words; it was ignorant of the text of the note, l>ut cr- 
lainly knew the contents. 



12 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Besides we have the admission of the German Government 
itself. In the Preface to the White Book, after reviewing the 
situation in which Austria found herself, owing to the Serajevo 
outrage, the official writer adds : " Under these circumstances, 
Austria could not help hut realise, that neither her dignity nor 
care for her safety would allow her to remain longer an inactive 
spectator of these machinations. The Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment made known to us its view of the matter and asked our 
opinion. From the bottom of our heart we were able to tell our 
ally that toe agreed entirely with him in his way of viewing the 
situation, and to assure him that any action he should consider 
necessary, to put an end to the movement directed in Servia against 
the existence of the monarchy, would have our approbation. By 
acting thus we were perfectly aware that Austria-Hungary's 
bellicose attitude towards Servia, might cause Russia to enter the 
arena, and that we, conformably to our duties as ally, might be 
drawn ourselves into the war... We therefore left Austria an 
absolutely free hand to act as she thought fit against Servia. But 
we took no part in the way in which she organised this ac- . 
tion (i) ". This is an admission that Germany knew, if not 
the actual terms, at least the spirit of the ultimatum and its 
general contents. It is possible that she did not know the 
terms of the despatch in detail. But even if she knew as little as 
she alleged, that fact which is of very secondary interest, did 
not authorise the German Government to declare so positively 
that it knew no more of the Austrian Note than did the other 
Powers, and that it in no way shared in the responsibility. 
Whatever it may say it knew the essential part. 

It not only knew it but it had approved of it. It agreed with 
it from the bottom of its heart, to borrow the expression above- 
quoted. It had made it its own. Germany must therefore be 
regarded as being co-partner with Austria in a step which the 
latter would never have dared to take, had she not been sure of 
the support of her powerful ally. Moreover public opinion 

(1) W. B., Pref., p. 4-5. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 13 

in Berlin was as much inclined to war as was public opinion 
in Vienna. " All Hie newspapers ", writes the Russian delegate 
at Berlin, on the 2,'jth of July, " welcome with the greatest sym- 
pathy the energetic tone adopted by Austria, even those who 
recognise the impossibility ol* Servia's accepting the terms de- 
manded (1) ". M. Cambon says : " A person of importance in 
Germany told me confidentially that it was feared here that Ser- 
via might accept the entire Austrian note (2) ". Germany herself 
had, from the beginning, a clearer consciousness of the risks to 
which she was exposing Europe; whereas in Austria it seems 
to have been thought that Russia would not " resist the blow " 
(ne tiendrait pas lc coup) to quote the words of a diplomatist, 
and would leave matters alone (3). On the contrary, on the 28th 
of July, in a confidential note, the German Chancellor warned 
the confederate Governments that if Russia intervened in favour 
of Servia, a European war would be the result ^4). 

The Attitude of the Powers. The first attempts at con- 
ciliation repulsed by Germany and Austria. — From this 
moment Germany, although not directly interested in the ques- 
tion, comes to the front, and her attitude is distinctly uncom- 
promising and even threatening. 

On the a^th of July Herr von Schoen went to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, temporary Minister for Foreign Affairs and stated the 
point of view of his Government. Germany considers, said he, 
that the question concerns Austria and Servia alone; it should 
therefore be settled between those two countries. Any inter- 
% ition by another Power would have "■incalculable conse- 
quences by bringing the alliances into play" (5). This was 
equivalent to refusing to Russia the right of intervention ((> . 

M) 0. B., no 7. 
(2) Y. B., no 47. 

Y. /-'., 00 12 and 50.; B. Cor., n° 71 rial 80. 
I W. B., n 1 2. 
(5) Y. /•'.. DO 28. 

day, it isiru>\ Men* von 
of a threatening nature in iii-- communication (Y.B., no 36). The same 
in London, the Austrian Ambassador explained to a- E2. Grey that 



14 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Now every one knew very well that it was morally and poli- 
tically impossible for Russia to stand completely aside. There 
exist close bonds of sympathy between the Prussian people and 
the Servian nation, arising not only from a community of 
historical traditions but also from a feeling of racial brother- 
hood. The great Russia, the natural and traditional protector 
of Slav communities, could not leave little Servia defenceless. 
Besides Russia herself had vital interests at stake; for Servia' 
once vanquished, would become an Austrian vassal, and that 
would mean the equilibrium of the Balkans upset for the profit 
of Austria (i). " Servia dominated by Austria ", said one day 
M. Sazonoff, Russian Minister for Foreign ' Affairs , is as 
intolerable to Russia as the domination of the (Netherlands 
by Germany would be to Great Britain. It is for Russia a 
question of life or death " (2). Beyond Servia therefore, Russia 
was aimed at and attacked by the ultimatum and the question 
as put by Germany might be expressed thus : either the weak- 
ening of Russia's prestige and her humiliation, or war. 

The other Powers were unanimous in seeing in the ultima- 
tum a scandal both in international law and in diplomacy. Sir 
E. Grey says, " I have never before seen one State address to 
another independent State a document of so formidable a cha- 
racter " (3). Italy herself, though she was the ally of Austria and 
Germany, made it known " that she would probably not have 
approved of the Austrian note ", had it been communicated to 
her before its publication, and she declined " all responsibility 
in the grave initiative taken by Austria " (4). Under these con- 
ditions, had Russia really wished for Avar as Germany has since 
accused her of doing, it was easy for her to attain her aim; 

Austrian note was not an ultimatum, but a d-marche with a time limit ' 
(Cor. B., no 14) and that is was merely a question of "military preparations, 
not of operations". These verbal protestat ons, which events were to belie, 
were only a means for allaying anxiety and f keepi g back the activity of 
the Powers. 

(1) B. Cor., no 97. 

(2) B. Cor., no 139. 

(3) B. Cor., no 5. 

(4) Y. B., no 56. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 15 

slv had on!v to let events follow their course. On the contrary 
M. Sazonoff immediately announced that he was resolved to lis 
every means to stop the conflict, lie said to M. Pal6ologue, the 
French Ambassador at St. Petersburg : " We must avoid 
everything which might precipitate the crisis. I consider that 
even if the Austro-IIungarian Government should proceed to 
action against Servia, we ought not to break, off negotia- 
tions " (i). He acted as he spoke and not only France but 
England and Italy joined him in his efforts. 

Germany, by her Ambassador in London had from the 
outset asked England to exert her infiuencejat St. Petersburg 
by advising non-intervention, in other words, by defending there 
the German point of view. Sir E. Grey replied that the terms 
of the ultimatum did not justify him in doing so, for the Rus- 
sian Government had good grounds forconsidering the Austrian 
demands inadmissible (2). But he proposed that the great 
Powers should together exercise a moderating influence at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg. For that purpose, German co-opera- 
tion was naturally indispensable. It was asked but categorically 
refused. The German Government replied that it could not 
.interfere in the conflict" (3). Thus the attempts made to 
find a way of conciliation came to nothing (4). 

Henceforward negotiations became difficult. As the time limit 
granted by the ultimatum was very short, it was judged most 
urgent to obtain an extension. In this way there would be time 
to take counsel before an irreparable act had been committed. 
The proposal was made by M. Sazonoff (5); France, England 

(1) Y. B., no 38. 

(2) Yet we read in the Preface to the White Book, that "both the French 
:n\.i English Governments had promised to act with the <;>Tinan Government" 
(p. '•). We are taken aback .it seeing a statement, manifestly contrary to th" 
truth, made so coolly. England and France would never have assented 
to leaving Russia aside. 

(nj )'. It., nos 36 and 87. 

(1) There is w< trace <>/ this first attempt at coiuiliation either in the Whi 
Book or in the Vrr\ace, 

(•) O. U., no i. ' 



16 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

and Italy promised to support it (i). it could, moreover, easily 
he justified; time was necessary for the Powers to examine Aus- 
tria's grievances. The request was addressed simultaneously to 
Berlin and to Vienna. In Berlin, when the Russian charge 
d'affaires, M. Bronewsky, in order to carry out his instructions, 
asked Herr von Jagow for an interview, the latter began by 
putting him off till late in the afternoon of the 25th, the very 
moment when the time limit of the ultimatum expired. After 
pressure, M. Bronewsky was ultimately received a little earlier, 
only, however, to be told that his proposal would be transmit- 
ted without comment to Vienna. Not only did Herr von Jagow 
refuse to support it, but he added that this step had not been 
taken soon enough, and that, besides, he thought it inexpedient 
for Austria to yield at the last moment; he even feared that such 
a move might " increase Servia's assurance ". In Vienna, when 
the Russian charge d'affaires called at the Foreign Office, Coun 
Berchtold happened to be away ; he was received by thet 
general secretary " whose manner however was freezing " and 
who, whilst assuring him that his communication should be 
transmitted, warned him without hesitation that the refusal 
would be categorical (2). 

From this moment, all that could be done was to await tb.3 
Servian reply to Austria. 

The Servian Reply. — The reply was anxiously awaited, for 
it was generally believed that Servia would not surrender, the 
Austrian demands being thought so exorbitant. All that could 
be hoped was, that she would not reply by an absolute refusal 
and thus put an end to all negotiations. 

On the 25th of July at 5. 45 p. m. she sent her reply which 
was a complete surrender. 

Servia undertook to make the solemn declaration demanded 
of her and in the exact terms prescribed. As for the ten 
remaining articles of the ultimatum two, but only two, were not 

ti; 0. /,'., nos 15 and 16. B. Cor., n° 29. 

('..') 0. B., nos 14 and 11, Y. B., n° 45. — Neither is there any trace in tlie 
White Book of this second attempt at conciliation and of its rebuff. 

E. DURKHEI.U and E. DENIS. — Allg. I 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 17 

accepted except with certain reservations. These concerned the 
co operation of foreign officials. 

The Servian Government indicated that it did not grasp 
clearly in what that co-operation could consist with regard to 
«' the destruction of the subversive movement". However it 
declared itself ready to admit such co-operation " as agrees 
with the principles of international law, with criminal pro- 
cedure and with good neighbourly relations " (art. 5). 

The participation of Auslro-llungarian authorities in the 
judicial enquiry was also judged impossible; as it would he 
"a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal 
procedure". Nevertheless, added the note "in concrete cases, 
communications as to the results of the investigation in question 
might be given to the Auslro-llungarian representatives " (art, 6). 

Serviu pledged herself to conform to all the other demands 
made by Austria. With regard to the measures to be taken 
against the intrigues of the press, the Servian Government did 
point out thai the present state of the law left it provision- 
ally unarmed, to provoke hatred of Austria not being legally 
a crime, and the confiscation of publications where these in- 
dues might be produced not being allowed by the Constitu- 
tion. But it undertook at the first convocation of the Skouptchina 
and at the approaching revision of the Constitution to have 
the necessary laws voted. 

Finally, in case the Austrian Government should not be sa- 
tisfied with its reply, the Servian Government declared itself 
" ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by 
referring this question to the decision of the International Tri- 
bunal of the Hague, or lo the great Powers ". 

Thus, even as regards the points reserved, the door stood 
fride open for an understanding. It can scarcely be doubled 
that this unhoped-lbr submission was due to the action of 
Russia. In fact, on the 27th of Jul) . that is to say al a date w hen 

ice was Mill more compromised than at the moment il 
which we have arrived, the Czar of Russia, in replj to an appeal 
made to him on the a'jth by the Crown Prince ol Servia, sent 

ft. 1 MS. -■ A J 



18 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

him urgent counsels of prudence and moderation. "My Govern- 
ment " said the Czar *'• is working hard to smoothe present 
difficulties. I do not doubt that your Highness and the Royal 
Government will facilitate this task by neglecting nothing to 
arrive at a solution which will prevent the horrors of a new war. 
whilst at the same time safeguarding the dignity of Servia. As 
long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed, all our 
efforts must be directed to thai end % 






//. — The diplomatic rupture and the declaration 
of war against Servia (July 25th-2Sth). 

Peace might have been thought assured. Herr von Jagow him- 
self recognised on the 20th of July, that " he saw (in the Servian 
reply) a possible basis for negotiations ". Unfortunately Austria 
was not content with the success she had obtained. The note 
was sent at 5.45 p. m. A few moments afterwards the Austrian 
minister broke oil diplomatic relations. He had not even taken 
the time materially necessary to look into a matter which might 
have such serious consequences. He must therefore have receiv- 
ed orders to break off in any case. This rupture was, besides, 
so entirely in conformity with the wishes of the Government 
and with public opinion that the news was greeted with enthu- 
si m in Vienna and in Berlin (i). 

Even at this moment Austria did not feel any need to justify 
her determination; it was only on the 28th of July that a nolo of 
explanation, and a very short one, was given to M. Bienvenu- 
Mulin. The Servian reply was declared to be entirely unsatis- 
f.i Lory on three essential points (a). 

[Tie reason given by Servia for not admitting in principle the 
participation of Austro-Hungarian representatives in tlic j>r* 
cution of the accessories to the plot residing on Servian terri- 
tory, was considered a vain excuse. It was said that Austria had 
demanded this co-operation for "police investigations "and not 
for " judicial enquiries " and that Servia, by substituting one 
expression for another, was equivocating. 

Secondly, it was declared that Ihe measures proposed 
pulling an end to the intriguing of the press were equivalent to 
a refusal, for actions against the press arc rarely successful, and 

(1) 5'. /.'., r, 17 i /•'. Cor., no 11. 

(2) Y. V., DCS 75 bis. 



20 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

besides, no definite date was fixed for the amendments that it 
was promised should be introduced into the law. 

Finally, in the article relative to anti-Austrian societies, though 
Servia promised to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, she 
deliberately omitted to consider the possibility of that society 
being formed again under another name (i). 

But it is difficult not to see what an enormous difference 
there is between the insignificance of these grievances and the 
gravity of the decision taken by Austria. 

As regards the last point more especially the Austrian com- 
plaints were inexplicable, for Servia had pledged herself to dis- 
solve not only the Narodna Odbrana but " any other society 
directing its efforts against Austria ". The name had therefore 
nothing to do with the matter. 

Regarding the measures to be taken against the press, Aus- 
tria, to prove the Servian proposal a disguised refusal, ought 
at least to have indicated some other legal procedure which 
would be more efficacious. Yet she indicated none. In fact we 
cannot see how it was possible to punish an act hitherto un- 
punishable without making a new law declaring it an offence, 
nor how publications could be legally confiscated if the Consti- 
tution forbade such confiscation. Or was Austria really asking 
Servia to act illegally and arbitrarily? 

The only serious point in dispute was, therefore, that which 
concerned the collaboration of the Austro-Hungarian authori- 
ties. But if the difficulty raised by Servia came merely from 
the fact, that the word " enquiry " had been wrongly substi- 
tuted for " investigation ", was it not possible to ascertain first 
by pacific means whether there had not been a misunder- 
standing on her part instead of at once taking up arms to 
decide the question? 

(1) This explanation and those which follow are borrowed, not from the 
note received by M. Bienvenu-Martin which states the Austrian grievances 
without justifying them, but from the White Book (p. 23 and following pages). 
The Servian reply is accompanied in it by a commentary of Austrian origin, 
the aim of which is to prove that the concessions of Servia are purely appa- 
rent 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 24 

A singular step on the part of Germany. — At this phase of 
the crisis, the general altitude of Austria and Germany remained 
what it had previously been. We shall soon have the proof of 
this. Meanwhile, Germany took at this moment a singular step 
which deserves our attention. 

On the aGlhof July, the morrow of the rupture, Herrvon Schoen 
called on M. Bienvenu-Martin and renewed the request thai 
Germany had already made to Sir E. Grey. " Austria ", said he, 
"has informed Russia that she is not seeking territorial aggran- 
disement; she merely wishes to ensure her tranquillity ". 
Peace would therefore be certain if Russia would refrain from 
all intervention, that is to say if she would allow Austria to 
inflict on Servia the treatment the latter deserves. Let France 
then use her influence to this end in St. Petersburg and she will 
be listened to ". " Germany ", he added, " is on the sideof France 
in her ardent desire for the maintenance of peace ". This affir- 
mation of solidarity was again insisted upon at the end of tht 
conversation (i). 

The same day at seven o'clock in the evening, the Ambas- 
sador returned to the Ministry. He went to the political Depart- 
ment and asked that a communique on the afternoon's con- 
versation might be sent to the press in order to avoid any 
erroneous comments. He even proposed to draw up this note 
in the following terms : " The German Ambassador and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had a further interview in the 
course of the afternoon, during which they examined in the most 
friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means 
which might be employed for the maintenance of general 
peace (2) ". The morning of the 27th he addressed a letter 00 
the same subject to the Political Director in which, after having 
again summarised the conversation of the day before, he. added : 
" .Note well the phrase as to the solidarity of pacific sentiments. 
It is not a meaningless phrase (3) ". 

(1) V. /?., no 56. 

(2) Y. //., no 57. 

(3) Y. D., no 62. 



22 THE ORIGIN OP THE WAR 

Naturally, the French Government refused to comply w^-b a 
request which could only deceive public opiniou ; for even 
supposing that Germany did share the pacific sentiments of 
France, the two Governments did not mean peace in the same 
way. Germany wished that Russia exclusively should bo 
influenced, so that the Vienna Cabinet might have a free hand ; 
France could only lend herself to action which would be 
undertaken at the same time in Vienna and St. Petersburg. But 
then, why ask for a public declaration that agreed so little with 
the real state of affairs? Was this not an attempt to make people 
believe that France was acting in concert with Germany, and 
thus to compromise the French Government with Russia and 
disorganise the dual alliance? In this way, Russia was being 
isolated while by means of pacific assurances, which were merely 
verbal, a kind of pretext was being prepared for throwing upon 
the allies the responsibility of the war, should it break out, as 
was now to be feared. 

Two further attempts at conciliation repulsed by Germany 
and Austria. — Whilst by this ambiguous attempt, Germany 
was pursuing only her private interests, the Powers of the 
Triple Entente, supported by Italy, were working hard in the 
interests of peace. Diplomatic relations were broken off but 
war was not declared; it was, perhaps, still possible to stop 
the conflict before the opening of hostilities. 

From the very beginaiag, Sir E. Grey had la^.d down with 
perfect clearness England's position in the discussion. 

In itself the Austro-Servian war did not concern him, and if 
Austria were able to settle her difference with Servia, without 
the intervention of Russia, he need not interfere (i). But he 
could not lose sight of the fact that if war between the two 
countries should be declared, it would be impossible for Russia 
to look on indifferent to the crushing of Servia. Now, this inter- 
vention of Russia, by drawing in that of Germany, threatened 
the European peace which England had every interest in safe- 

(1) B. Cor., no 10. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 23 

guarding. Though Servia concerned her little, peace concerned 
iier greatly. There was, it is true, a means of attaining this end 
which it seemed could have heen very efficacious; that would 
nave heen to consolidate in advance with Russia and France and 
to announce that in case of Avar, England would support the 
two allies. In fact, it was possible to believe that if Germany knew 
that the English fleet would be against her, she might be less 
arbitrary. M. Sazonoff did not fail to point this out to the English 
Government (i). 

However Sir Ed. Grey refused several times to engage himself 
on this point in any way which would bind him for the future. 
As long as Austria and Servia alone were concerned, public 
opinion in England would not have understood going to war 
on a question which did not directly affect English 
interests (a). Without doubt if the conflict became general it 
was more than likely that England would be drawn into it ; 
but her attitude would depend on circumstances, and for tha/: 
reason she was anxious to retain her liberty of action. This 
implied that, if Russia precipitated matters, England would not 
be responsible for the consequences that might result (3). 
Sir Ed. Grey added that he would have more authority in 
negotiating with the German Government, if he did not 
announce himself in advance as an eventual adversary (4). 

He was moreover particularly qualified to undertake these 
negotiations, for the absence of precise obligations between the 
Governments in question, permitted him to view the situation 
with perfect impartiality. He recognised that Austria might 
have serious grievances against Servia (5) ; he even went so far 
as to say that the latter needed to be taught a lesson. But he 
considered that, under the pretext of humiliating Servia, llie 
humiliation of Russia must not be involved (6) The Servian 

(1) B. Cor., no 6. 

{2) B. Cor., no 24. 

(3) B. Cor., no 17. 

(4) It. Cor., n> 44. 
(■') B. Cor., no 5. 
(6) B. Cor., flC 90. 



24 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

reply seemed to him to give satisfaction to Austria further thai* 
could have been expected. He saw in it at least a basis for dis- 
cussion and reflection (i). 

On all these points an understanding was easy with Russia. 
She, too, recognised that Austria had grounds for complaint 
and that "some of her demands were reasonable enough", but 
that others were impraticable, at least at the moment ; these were 
the demands which demanded alterations in the laws regarding 
the press and the societies. There were some also which were 
incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State (2). 
"If", said M. Sazonoff to the Austrian Ambassador, "you have 
pursued no other aim than the protection of your territory against 
the agitation of Servian Anarchists", your intentions are legiti- 
mate, "but the step to which you have had recourse is not 
defensible. Take back your ultimatum", he concluded, " modify 
its form, and I will guarantee the result" (3). In precise terms, 
all that he asked was "that the territorial integrity of Servia 
should be guaranteed, and that her rights as a sovereign State 
should be respected so that she should not become Austria's 
vassal". Within these conditions he declared himself ready" to 
use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Govern- 
ment to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria" (4). 
Two means were tried in order to arrive at this result. 
Taking up, but in more detail, the idea he had 
expressed from the very beginning, Sir Ed. Grey proposed that 
the four great Powers not directly concerned in the debate, 
should intervene as mediators. The Ambassadors of France, 
Germany and Italy should be authorised to meet in conference 
with Sir Ed. Grey for the purpose of discovering a way out; but 
Servia, Russia and Austria should be induced to "abstain 
from all active military operations" pending the results of the 
conference (5). This procedure seemed to offer many advan* 

(1) B. Cor., no 46. 

(2) O. B., no 25. 

(3) Y. B., no 54. 

(4) B. Cor., no 55. 
l&\ R. Cor., no 36. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 25 

tnges : Servia would submit more easily to Europe than to 
Austria and, by gaining time, Ibe cbances of a pacific solution 
Mould be increased. 

Tbe idea was accepted eagerly by France and Italy (r), 
M. Sazonofl declared himself equally ready to give his adhe- 
rence. But in the meantime he had attempted to come to an 
understanding by other means ; he had offered to Austria to 
confer directly with her, without h&ving recourse to any inter- 
mediary. He was therefore obliged to await the answer to his 
proposal. But even should the conversation he desired take 
place, lie thought it advisable that he should keep in contact 
with the Powers and that these should keep in touch with each 
other. Consequently these two plans,, far from excluding, 
complemented each other (2). 

England soon knew the fate of her plan : Germany absolutely 
refused to have anything to do with it. She indeed accepted, 
in vague terms, the general principle of a mediation on the part 
of the four Powers, but refused a conference. It would, she 
said, be making Austria and Bussia appear before a court of 
arbitration, which seemed to her inadmissible. In vain. Sir 
E. Grey and the English Ambassador in Berlin replied that it 
would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discus- 
sion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settle- 
ment (3). Ilerr von Jagow maintained his position without in 
any way justifying it. ( >n the 27th of July he had a conversa- 
tion with M. J. Cambon on this very subject, which, at one 
iiiMiient, took a pathetic turn. As he repeated once more that it 
was impossible to "call together a conference to discuss the 
affairs of Austria and Bussia", M. Cambon expostulated. Sir 
E. Grey's proposal, said he, was above a question of form. 
Whal was important wis the association of England and France 
with Germany and Italj in working for peace; this association, 
once formed, could "show itself in common action in Vienna 

(!) II. C,,r., n 18 '.M nd 51. 

(2) B. Cor., n s 53 and 55. 

(3) B. Cur., no 43 and 67. 



26 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

and in St. Petersburg", and it would be a fine and salutary 
example for four Powers belonging to the two groups, instead 
of perpetually opposing each other, to act together to prevent 
the conflict. It would thus be seen that a European spirit really 
existed. Herr von Jagow gave evasive answers; he urged his 
engagements with Austria ; he pretended that he had not yet 
read the Servian reply, though it was known throughout Europe 
(it was now the 27th of July). At last, tired and no doubt irritated 
by these obscure and elusive replies, M. Gambon suddenly asked 
his interlocutor "if Germany wanted war". And as the latter 
assured him of his good intentions, the French Ambassador 
added : "You must then act up to them. When you read 
the Servian reply, I heg you in the name of humanity, to weigh 
the terms with your conscience, and do not personally assume a 
portion of the responsibility for the catastrophe you are allowing 
to be prepared" (1). To this appeal there was no response. 

The Russian proposal fared no better. The German Govern- 
ment had declared several times that it favoured this proposal; 
after all it had no reason for opposing it, since Germany was in 
no way involved (2). But when asked to support it at Vienna 
and to invite in a friendly way the Austrian Government to 
"'accept this means of reconciliation 1 ', Herr von Jagow replied 
"'that he could not advise Austria to yield (3)". Austria, too, 
did nothing towards entering into Russia's views of the question. 
Already M. Sazonoff and the Austrian Ambassador had had a 
private conversation and the result had seemed satisfactory : they 
virtually agreed as to the nature of the guarantees which could 
be legitimately demanded of Servia (4). Under these conditions, 
M. Sazonoff asked Count Berchtold to furnish the Austrian 
Ambassador with full powers and instructions so that the 
discussion begun privately, might be continued officially. But 
on the 28th M. Sazonoff had not yet received an answer and he 

(1) Y. B., no 74. 

(2) Y. B., no 74 ; 0. B., no 49. 

(3) O. B., no 38. 

(4) 0. B., no 32 ; B. Cor., no 56. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 27 

began to realise that "Austria did not wish to talk" (i). In fact, 
at the same moment. Count Berchtold informed the Russian 
Ambassador at Vienna that he would have to decline to enter 
into a discussion on the terms of the Austrian note (a). This 
was equivalent to declining the very principle o\ the negotia- 
tions^). 

Besides, that very day the event took place which it was so 
desirable to avoid or delay. After the rupture of the diplomatic 
relations, Austria confined herself to mobilising; she even let 
it be understood that hostilities would not begin at once. Now, 
on the 28th,. as. if it were desired to cut short the negotiations 
jn progress, war was declared and military operations began 
at once (4). This decision was all the more regrettable as the 
Servian delegate at Rome was, with the Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, taking steps of a nature to facilitate peace. 
** If ", said he, " explanations were given regarding tiie 
mode in which Austrian agents will require to intervene under 
Ait. 5 and Art. 6, Scrvia might still accept the whole Austrian 
note " (5). The Marquis of San Giuliano, on his side, pointed out 
that if Austria, for reasons of dignity, refused to give these 
(ietails to Servia, she could without any difficulty make them 
kn »\vn to the Powers, who would transmit them to the Servian 
Government. The question as to whether the words " enquiry " 
and " investigation " were or were not synonymous might thus 
b^ elucidated otherwise than by arms. 

Why, then, had this violent resolution been taken in the 
midst of negotiations which it seemed destined to cut short- 
^mong the suspicions it arouses, wrote M. Paleologue on 
Mie 28th. "the most disturbing is that Germany may have 

_m1 her (Austria) to aggression against Scrvia, so as to bo 

(1) Y. D., n 1 82. 

(2) //. Oor., n ■ 61. 

(3) 0. //., n 1 50. 

''.) Already before the declaration of war, the Aostrians had fire<i on 
two Servian Bteamen and had damaged them i two Servian merchant-ve 
had been captured by a Hungarian monitor (D. Cor., n 1 G5). 

(.'■) IS. Cor., n l 64. 



28 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

able herself to enter the lists against France and Russia in 
circumstances which, she supposes, ought to be the most favour- 
able for her and in conditions which have been considered in 
advance" (i). We merely reproduce this opinion as informalion 
for our readers. 

(l) Y. B., do 83. 



///. — The first ultimatum of Germany to Russia 
(July the 29th and 30th). 

Thus the more the crisis developed the more remote seemed 
a pacific solution. In vain England, Russia, France and Italy 
joined their forces to prevent the dreaded result; each of the 
phases we have been describing was a step towards war. 
This was indeed so imminent that it all but broke out on the 
3oth of July. 

The Triple Entente and Italy continue the negotiations. Ths 
evasive attitude of Germany. — Everyone thought that if 
Servia were attacked, Russia would be obliged to march at 
once to her assistance (i). And yet, even after the declaration 
of war, the conciliatory intentions of M. Sa/.onoff remained 
unchanged. On the 29th of July M. Paleologue informed the 
French Government "that the Russian Government acquiescs 
in any step which may be proposed to it by France and 
England for the safeguarding of peace" (2). The same language 
was used in London (3). All that M. SazonolT asked was that 
no time should be lost so as to prevent Austria from taki 
advantage of this delay to crush Servia. 

Judging by appearances it was possible to think the chances 
of peace still good, for Germany's language at this moment 
seemed to take a more favourable turn. 

It seemed as though a sudden change had taken place and 
as if the Berlin Cabinet had now decided to cxcivisr its 
influence at Vienna in favour of peace. In facl on the morning 
of the 3i)th, Il'ir von Schoen, informally it is true, will to 
inform M. Bienvenu-Marlin that the German Government was 

(i) n. Cor., no 11. 

>'. /;., no 
(3) ti. C .-., no 78; 0. B., no 50. 



30 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

using its influence to persuade the Austrian Government to 
make known Hie aim and extent of Hie operations in Servia. 
"The Berlin Cabinet", he added, "hopes to receive details 
which will be such as to give satisfaction to Russia... Whan 
it is known how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis 
for discussion" (i). The same communication Avas made at 
St. Petersburg (2) and at London (3). On the 3oth the German 
Chancellor said to Sir E. Goschen that he " was pressing the 
button" to put into action the mechanism of mediation; lie 
was even not sure whether he had made the mistake of going 
too far in urging moderation at Vienna, that matters had been 
precipitated rather than otherwise (4). 

These fair words, though somewhat vague, might seem 
reassuring. Unfortunately neither in the diplomatic documents 
nor in the march of events could ihere be seen any trace of 
the conciliatory influence that Germany pretended to be exercis- 
ing almost to excess. 

The German Government has published a While Book 
exclusively intended to prove that it is not responsible for the 
war, and that it did all that was humanly possible in favour of 
peace. The best way to prove this statement would have been 
to publish the despatches in which it gave its Ambassador at 
Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, these pacific instructions. Now, cut 
of the 27 documents contained in the White Book, there is not 
a single one which has this object in view. Nowhere is there any 
question of any influence being exercised on the Austrian 
Government to urge it to be more moderate in its demands. 
We certainly see the German Chancellor, in a telegram of the 
27U1 of July, transmit to Vienna M. Sazonoff's and Sir E. Grey's 
proposals of which we have already spoken, but he did not 
support Ibcm in any way; then one finds a telegram dated the 
28U1 in which Herr von Tschirsky replies that Count Berchtoid 

(1) Y. B., no 94. 

(2) D. Cor., no 93, 2 and annexe. 

(3) B. Cor., no 84. 

(4) B. Cor., no 107. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 31 

refuses them as too late in arriving, war against Servia having 
been already declared. And that is all. No doubt, a diplomatic 
collection generally contains only selected documents. Hut it 
would seem surprising that the German Chancellery should 
have omitted precisely those which it had the greatest advan- 
tage in publishing. 

Are Germany's pacilic inclinations, in default of written 
instructions, shown by acts ? 

Since Austria had absolutely refused direct negotiations 
wilh Russia, there was now only one means left : that was to 
fall back on the English plan and for the four disinterested 
Powers to intervene by a conference, or by any other method. 
Circumstances seemed favourable. Now that Austria had 
obtained some satisfaction by bombarding Belgrade she might 
perhaps be less hostile to the idea of allowing Europe to settle 
the question. Moreover the new concessions that Servia said 
she was willing to make (see above p. 26) might render an 
arrangement easier (1). So M. Sazonoff asked at once that the 
English proposal might be taken up (3). 

Sir E. Grey spoke of it again to Prince Lichnowsky, who, 

I. >wever, gave the same refusal as before, and the same reasons 
as a justification. It seemed to him inadmissible Hut Austria 
should be brought before a European Court. But Sir Ed. Grey 
insisted. Germany had accepted the principle of mediation. If 

I I, a Hie words " conference "and " arbitration " frightened her, 
il was ior her to say under what form she considered that 
mediation possible which she herself considered necessary. 
Any formula - gested by her would be gratefully agreed to. 
should it allow of the maintenance of peace (3). Germany was 
thus obliged to renounce the vague generalities in which Bhe 
had persisted until then and to make at last some definite pro- 
i d. We shall soon sec whether the mediation of which she 
Bpoki waa but a word, or whether, on the contrary, she Baw 

(I) D. C r., no 00. 
1 b., no 48. 

I 1 }'. U., no 08 ; D. Cor., n 8i. 



32 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

in it a concrete reality. As M. Cambon said, " she was driven 
into a corner " (i). 

Without doubt she found the question embarrassing for, on 
the 3oth, she had not yet answered it; and yet the moment had 
arrived when hours and even minutes were of inestimable 
value (2). When M. Cambon questioned Ilerr von Jagow as to this 
delay, the latter made excuses, replying that '" in [order to gain 
time " he had decided to act directly and that he " had asked 
Austriaonwhat basis conversations with her could takeplace(3)". 
He even boasted that he had advised her to declare openly that 
her exclusive object in opening hostilities was to secure the gua- 
rantees necessary to her existence (4). But even had Austria 
consented to make this declaration, the progress of the negotia- 
tions would not have been facilitated, for the Austro-Hungarian 
Government had already stated many times that it only asked 
for indispensable guarantees. Unfortunately it was still unknown 
what was meant by these. In a word, by adopting this manner 
of proceeding, Germany evaded, instead of answering, the 
embarrassing question she was asked ; she avoided saying how 
she understood this action of the Powers which she admitted 
in principle but which she, in reality, in all its practical forms, 
•set on one side. 

Yet Germany had a very simple means of working for peace, 
which was to bring her weight to bear on the Vienna Cabinet and 
to persuade it to lay claim only to acceptable guarantees. Russia 
contented herself with asking Austria to respect Servia's rights 
as a sovereign State in addition to her territorial integrity. The 
important point was, in fact, that Servia should not become 
politically dependent on Austria. Let Austria give assurances 
regarding this point and peace was almost certain. But when 
M. Sazonoff asked the German Government to help him to obtain 
them, he met with a refusal. Herrvon Pourtales, with whom he 

(1) y. B., no 81. 

(2) Y, /?, m 108. 
.(3) Y. £., no 109. 
ty.) D. Cor., no 75. 



x 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 33 

had a conversation on this subject, merely replied that he would 
transmit his request to Berlin, but that he could do no more. 
He even added that to make such a proposal to Germany was 
to ask her " to do with regard to Austria what Austria was 
reproached with wishing to do with regard to Servia; it was to 
interfere in her sovereign rights. By declaring that she had no 
territorial pretensions, Austria had pledged herself to lake into 
account Russian interests, a great concession on the part of a 
Stale engaged in war. She ought therefore to be allowed to settle 
her affairs with Servia alone. It would be lime enough when 
the peace conference was held to come back to the question as 
to whclher the sovereignty of Servia should be spared and in 
w hat measure " (i). 

The real policy of Germany, then, agreed in no way with her 
language; whilst protesting an ardent desire to safenguard 
C ice, she rejected every means proposed for reaching thai end 
and suggested none herself. The principles which guided the 
Germ in Government explain this ambiguity. According toil, in 
effect. Russia had no grounds for intervening, but ought to 
sland aloof from Servia; since Austria had promised to respect 
S man territory nothing more was required of her. Xow, 
Ihi^ is what Russia could not admit. The peace which Germany 
said she was so desirous to bring about, was Urns dependent 
a condition which rendered war inevitable. The mediation 
is offering, was the reverse of mediation; for the part of 
a mediator docs not consist in disregarding the interests and 

(1) W. B., p. 9. — We read, however, in the Preface to the White Book : 
" U our suppestion the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received in inic- 
tions on the 29th July to enter into conversation With M. Sazonoff. Count 

pary was authorised to explain to the Russian Minister the note addi 
ed to Servia, and lo accept a i >n from Russia, as well a? to dis 

with M. fiazono/f all questions concerning Austro-Russian relations (p. 10). 
We have fust seen what language the German Ambassador u : I 
i on the 29i/j July ; there is no trace of the con n which, 

at t'i moment, the Government at Berlin is said l" have suggested to the 

Calin-i at Vienna. Besides, on the 29tli Count Berchtold had just ret 
any direct conversation with Russia. We see what respect the White Book 
the truth. Besides, it, of course, does not quote any document in 
support of its a i^.tion. 

ORKHBIM and K D8N18 — Ang. 3 



ni THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

claims of one of the suitors in the case. She spoke of calming 
the conflit, but forgot the difficulty which was the origin of it. 
She uttered the word conciliation but understood by it the entire 
submission of one of the two adversaries. Nowhere is there more 
glaring evidence of this contradiction than in two telegrams 
sent by the German Emperor at about this time, to the Czar of 
Russia. Having returned from a cruise on the 26th, William II 
telegraphed on the 28th to his cousin to tell him that he was 
going to use his influence at Vienna; but at the same time he 
declared emphatically that Austria's demands were entirely 
justified; and as the Czar, in his reply, had protested against 
this assertion, William II telegraphed again to maintain it. He 
added imperiously that, in the Austro-Servian war, Russia ought 
to play the part of a spectator, and that, moreover, it was easy 
for her to do so (1). 

Finally, a proof of what Germany's disposition really was, is 
that, during the very days that these negotiations were taking 
place, she was preparing to take action, which, if accomplished, 
would immediately have caused war. 

The first ultimatum of Germany to Russia. — From the very 
beginning of the crisis, the Russian Government had been obli- 
ged to give its attention to the military measures which might 
become necessary. On the 25th July at a Cabinet Council pre- 
sided over by the Czar, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps 
was considered, destined to act eventually against Austria. 
However it was not to become effective unless Austria should 
take up arms against Servia, and only after notification by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (2). On the 29th July, it was judged 
that the moment had arrived. War against Servia had begun the 
day before ; moreover Austria refused all compromises and all 
conversations; in fact she had already mobilised eight army 
corps and had even begun to mass troops in Galicia on the 

(1) W. B., nos 20 jjid 22, 

(2) Y. B., no 50. 



x 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 35 

Russian frontier (i). It was therefore decided to mobilisa tear 

military districts. 

This decision was officially communicated to the German 
Government in the most friendly terms; it was assured that 
Russia had no aggressive intention against Germany (2). Austria 
was also informed that the mobilisation implied no hostile 
intention, but only " aimed at marking the intention and the 
rights of the Czar to express his view in the settlement of the 
Servian question ". The Austrian Government, loo. did not 
resent it; Count Berchlold and M. Schebeko, the Russian Am- 
bassador at Vienna, even had a conversation on the 3oth during 
which very pacific proposals were exchanged (3). We shall speak 
of these again later. 

l'.ut Germany, although she was not menaced, took matters 
very differently. Even during the day of the 29th, Count de Pour- 
tales went to tell M. Sazonoff that, if Russia did not stop 
her military preparations, the German army would receive 
orders to mobilise; and events will show us that, for Germany 
mobilisation meant war (4). Moreover the tone in which this 
notification was given, said M. Sazonoff, " decided the Russian 
Government to order that very evening (Jul\ a$th-3oth) the 
mobilisation of the thirteen army corps destined to operate 
against Austria (5). Thus the German Government did not shrink 
mi biting war loose upon Europe on account of a mea- 
sure which did not concern it, which was only directed against 
Austria, and nevertheless which Austria accepted without pro- 
test. 

And the threat was very near to being carried out. During 
the evening of the agtht, an extraordinary Council was held at 

(I) V. !i., nos 95, 97, 101. 
<2) K. C r., no 70. 
Y. /.'., no l .. 
Cf.W. B., Pref., p. 7. 
! ) V. /•'., M loo. — However, M. Vivi.mi ha- big ' 

desim that no military measvDe should ba taken that might give 
a pretext fnr t:«-ii"ral mobilisation, M Sazonofl lei him know thai in the 
course of the night the General Staff had suspendi I 
measures that might have caused a misunderstanding ( ). />'., ao 102). 



36 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Potsdam under the presidency of the Emperor. The military 
authorities had been summoned to it. Decisions were taken 
which were not made public, but which, certainly, were not in 
favour of peace; for the Chancellor sent in haste for the English 
Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, and after having expressed to 
him the fear that a European conflagration might become ine- 
vitable, made " a high bid to insure the neutrality of En- 
gland ''. If, said he, Great Britain would consent to stand aloof, 
the Imperial Government was ready to give every assurance 
that, in case of victory, it would not seek any territorial aggran- 
disement at the expense of continental France; he refused, 
however, to make the same engagement regarding the French 
colonies. At the same time, he promised that Germany would 
respect the neutrality of Holland, if it were equally respected 
by the other belligerents. As for Belgium, " it depended upon" 
the actions of France what operations Germany might be forced 
to enter upon in Belgium "; in any case, if Belgium did not side 
against Germany, she should be evacuated after the war. Finally, 
he ended by reminding Sir Ed. Goschen that ever since he had 
been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about 
an understanding with England. " He trusted that these assu- 
rances might form the basis of that understanding which he so 
much desired. He had in his mind a general neutrality agreement 
between Germany and England... and an assurance of British 
neutrality in the conflict would enable him to look forward to 
realisation of his desire (i) ". 

The fact that this conversation took place in haste, immedia- 
tely after the conference at Potsdam, proves that it had been 
decided on by resolutions taken during the course of that con- 
ference and that the question which the Chancellor discussed 
with the Ambassador was considered by him as being excep- 
tionally urgent. Now this question presupposed a declaration ot 
war. Measures, then, had just been taken at Potsdam which 
rendered war imminent. And, in fact, on the 3oth, towards 

(1) B. Oor., do 85. 



X 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 37 

one o'clock in the afternoon, the Lokal Anzeiger issued a special 
edition in which there was to be found the decree giving the or- 
ders for general mobilisation (i). 

However an hour afterwards. Ilerr von Jagow telephoned to 
the Ambassador to deny the news, and the Government ordered 
the copies of the newspaper, in which it had been published, 
to be seized. But the Lokal Anzeiger, a semi-official organ, 
would not have prepared a special edition lo announce a mea- 
sure of such gravity, had it not really been taken. After the deed 
was done, it had been decided to go back on it, but the Govern- 
ment forgot to inform the newspaper. This sudden change is 
explained, moreover, by another step taken by M. de Pourlales; 
this same night of the 29th 3oth, he returned to M. Sazonoff, 
and. though he urged again that Russia should cease her mili- 
tary preparations, it was in a tone much less categorical and in 
no way threatening. He merely asked under what conditions 
Russia would suspend her mobilisation. The ultimatum was 
w ithdrawn (2). 

The conversation that Ilerr von Belhmann-Holhveg had had 
some hoars before with Sir E. Goschcn, had, most probably, 
much lo do with this change of attitude. The English Ambas- 
sador had, in fact, replied with the greatest reserve to the warm 
appeal that had been addressed to him, and to the offers that 
had been made. He confined himself lo declaring that, in his 
opinion, Sir E. Grey would not care to bind himself to any 
course of action but would desire to retain full liberty (3). A 
little later in the night, the Chancellor Avas informed, by a tele- 
gram from London, of a conversation that had taken place, that 
very day, between Sir E. Grey and the German Ambassador. 
Sir E. Grey had taken the initiative of warning Prince Lich- 
nowsky that, if war broke out. and if France were drawn into 
it in the wake of Germany and Russia, he would not bind him- 
self " t" stand aside ".He had added, moreover, that he did not 

(1) O. R., no 61. 

(.1 )'. //., no 1":). 
(3) B. Cor., no 85. 



38 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

wish to use anything in the nature of a threat; for that reason 
he declined to specify the circumstances in which England 
might intervene. He simply desired to preserve his liberty ot 
action ; but he did not wish the friendly tone of his conver- 
sations with the Prince to mislead the German Government 
into supposing that England would not take action in any case. 
Above all, he was anxious not to lay himself open in the future 
" to the reproach that if they had not been, so misled the course 
of things might have been different " (i). This conversation, 
which confirmed the preceding, was still more significant and 
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg easily understood all its import {2). 
Germany was essentially anxious for England to remain neu- 
tral (3); the steps taken by the Chancellor is the best proof ot 
this and we shall find others. The only reason by which she 
could justify at this moment a general mobilisation against 
Russian was untenable, since Austria, the only Power inte- 
rested, made no objections to the Russian preparations. It was 
therefore to be feared that war declared under these conditions, 
might be one of those circumstances of which Sir E. Grey had 
spoken and which would force him to intervene. This was why 
it was resolved to suspend the measures already decided on and 
to wait (4). 

A farther pacific proposal on the part of Russia rejected by 
Germany. — But this incident offered M. Sazonoff another 
opportunity of shoAving the sincerity of his pacific intentions. 

During the course of his second visit to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Count de Pourtales had repealed once more that 
the promise given by Austria not to encroach on Servian terri- 
tory, ought to satisfy Russia. " It is not only the territorial inte- 
grity of Servia which we must safeguard ", replied M. Sazo* 
no IT, " but also her independence and her sovereignty ". Then 

(\) B. Cor., no 89. 

(2) II. Cor., no 98, in fine. 

(3) B. Cor., nos 75 ard 76. 

(4) In the German White Book, as in the Preface, there is no trace oj this 
ultimatum nor oj the events W.ih which it is connected. 



X 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 39 

lie added : " The situation is too serious for me not to tell yoi£ 
all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburg, while 
refusing to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain 
time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom 
before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas 
is so anxious to prevent war that in his name I am going to 
make you a fresh proposal : If Austria recognising thai her dis- 
pute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of Eu- 
ropean interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ulti- 
matum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignly oj 
Servia, Russia will undertake to stop all military prepara- 
tions " (i). ' 

Count de Pour'ales promised to transmit this proposal to his 
Government. But the same day, Herr von Jagow when, informed 
of it, said, without even consulting Vienna, that he considered 
such a proposal inacceptable to Austria. (2) 

To sum up. there is at this period a marked contrast between 
the words and the deeds of the German Government. We may 
indeed ask ourselves if its words were not intended to cover its 
deeds and to make people believe that the measures taken or 
prepared at this moment by Germany, were forced upon her by 
the malignity of her adversaries, in spite of herself and of the 
pacific sentiments which her words professed. 

(I) }'. B., no 103 ; O. B., no GO. 

2] 0. !■■ 11 63; Y. B.. no 107. — In \hi Gamin While Book, there is 
no trace oj this further attempt at conciliation. 



IV. — The declaration of war against Russia 
and against France (July 3lst~c4ug. 3rd). 

We arrive now at the crisis. In consequence of the insecurity 
and mutual distrust in which all the peoples of Europe were 
living, the question of mobilisation arose afresh in a more acute 
form and the result was war. 

The second ultimatum of Germany to Russia. — Austria had 
as yet only mobilised a part of her troops; but on the 3ist July, 
at an early hour, general mobilisation was decreed; all men 
from 19 to 42 years of age were called out (1). The measure was 
a grave one. No doubt Count Berchtold thought he could take 
this step without inconvenience; for, only the day before, 
M. Schebeko and he had agreed that military preparations made 
nn either side need not be considered as acts of hostility. 

At this news, Russia judged it natural that she should take 
similar precautions. Besides she knew that, for some days, Ger- 
many was preparing for mobilisation : the German fleet off Nor- 
way returned to Germany; the reservists had received orders 
not to absent themselves (cf above, p. 11); officers on leave were 
recalled, owners of motor-cars were invited to hold these at the 
disposal of the military authorities; important movements of 
troops were taking place near to the Gulf of Finland, etc. Under 
these conditions, and especially taking into consideration the 
extreme slowness of the Russian mobilisation, it seemed impos- 
sible to wait any longer. On the 3ist July, towards the middle 
of the day, a general mobilisation of the army and navy was 
ordered (2). 

(1) Y. B., no 115. 

(2) B. Cor., no 113 ; Y. B., no 118. — This important fact that the general 
mobilisation of Austria was anterior to the general mobilisation of Russia ut 
nowhere mentioned in the White Cook. Yet that it was anterior is certai'w 
It is proved not only by the explicit telegram sent by M. PalSologue, bn. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 41 

Austria received llie news without raising any objection ; at 
this very moment, as we shall soon sec, the relations between 
the two countries were improving and from that hour wont on 
improving. But in Berlin the protests were vigorous and were 
immediately translated into action. As early as 2 p. m., the Ger- 
man Emperor had sent a telegram to the Czar of a very threaten- 
ing nature. He did not yet mention the Russian mobilisation, but 
complained of the military measures that were said to have been 
taken against him on his Eastern frontier. lie announced that 
he would be obliged to take " the same defensive precautions ", 
and without saying that war would necessarily result, insinuated 
that it was inevitable if Russia did not cease arming; he declined 
all responsibility beforehand and threw it entirely on the Em- 
peror Nicholas (1). 

.1 state of danger oj war (Kriegsgefahrzustandj was also 
decreed ; it is even possible that the decree preceded the tele- 
gram. The result of this measure was, in effect, to break off Ihe 
relations between Germany and other countries, and allowed the 
Government to proceed immediately to a real mobilisation. 
Finally at midnight, the Russian mobilisation having become 
known at Rcrlin in the meantime, Count de Pourtalcs ordered 
M. SazonofT to stop within twelve hours all military prepara- 
tions "against Germany as welt as against Austria ", otherwise 
Germany would mobilise (2). This was an ultimatum of a most 

also by the report addressed to his Government by Sir M. de Bunsen after 
his return to England t />'. Cor., no 161). There is indeed a telegram from the 
same ambassador fixing the peneral mobilisation of the army and the licet 
for Aug. 1st (Is. Cor., no 127) ; but by that is meant thai Aug. 1st was the 
■ day of the mobilisation; the decree was promulgati I before. 

The German press makes very much of a letter written by a Belgian 
diplomatic agent, a M. de PEscaille, which was intercepted by the German 
cabinet ioir. In this letter, M. de 1 E ailli ! sentiment at 

favourable to Germany, saying that sho had done all in her power to prevent 
war. \ sine e fact shows what faith we may have in the source from which 
Mr aiUe draw; his information; be -ays in his tetter, dated July 

31 th, that the decree for general mobilisation was pubUalud <>n th" 10 th 
at '.. a. m., which is certainly inoccumalo. And yet the date of a , 
tion this kind can easilj be verified^ 

(i) if. B., Prof., p. 13. 

(2) II'. //., no 25. 



42 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

offensive form for a great country for it contained a formal sum- 
mons to Russia to reply within a time limit. Moreover it de- 
manded that she should cease mobilising, not only against Ger- 
many, i. e. on the frontier of Eastern Prussia, but even in the 
South, against Austria who was mobilising all her forces. Eveni t 
did not occur to the German Government, that, in any case, bare 
justice required that the same demand should be addressed to 
the Government at Vienna ; in other words, it was demanded 
ihat Russia should put herself vis-a-vis Austria, in such a posi- 
tion of manifest inferiority as Austria herself did not claim. 
When Sir E. Goschen expressed his surprise to Herr von Jagow 
that the German Government had thus made the ultimatum 
more difficult for Russia to accept, Herr von Jagow replied 
that " it Avas in order to prevent Russia from saying that all her 
mobilisation was only directed against Austria (i). 

As Count de Pourtales said, if it was not war already, it was 
very near it. 

A new formula of compromise accepted by Austria and reject- 
ed by Germany. — And yet at this very time, negotiations 
were going on outside Germany and were taking a more favour- 
able turn than they had yet taken. Were it not for the German 
threats, one might have thought peace quite near. 

We have seen (see above, p. 35) that, on the 3oth July, after 
the partial mobilisation of the Russian army, a conversation of 
a very conciliatory nature had taken place at Vienna between 
Count Berchtold and M. Schebeko, but we have not yet men- 
tioned the most important proposals which were discussed 
during this interview. Not only had a mutual desire for peace 
been expressed, but the very root of the difference had been 
attacked. For the first time the Austro-Servian conflict and the 
means oi settling it were discussed. It was agreed that the con- 
versations begun privately between M. Sazonoff and M. Szapary 
should be taken up officialy; these had been interrupted on the 
28th by Count Berchtold, who refused to give his Ambassador 

(1) B. Cor., no 121. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 43 

the authority necessary to continue them (see above, p. 2G) : 
According to the Austrian Minister, this refusal was due to a 
misunderstanding, hut M. Szapary was to he immediately 
"authorised to discuss what settlements would be compatible 
with the dignity and prestige f<>r which both Empires had an 
equal concern". Never had Austria made a concession of such 
importance. On his side, too, the Kussian Ambassador staled 
"that his Government would pay much more regard bo the de- 
mands of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy than was supposed (1) 

\' this time Germany complained to some of the Powers that 
the effort?; she was making, as she said, to urge peace and mo- 
deration at Vienna, were seriously handicapped by the Russian 
mobilisation against Austria (2). As a matter of fact, Austria had 
never shown herself so conciliatory and so much disposed to 
negotiate. It is impossible to conceive what grounds the Ger- 
man Government can have had for staling what is manifestly 
contradicted by the facts as they are known to-day. The truth 
is that the Kussian mobilisation marks the critical moment from 
which we notice, a contrast between the attitudes of Germany 
and Austria which grows stronger and stronger as time goes 
on. The more the former inclined towards war, the more the 
latter inclined towards peace. 

V new formula elaborated by England and Russia was, more- 
over, going to make it easier for Austria to change her mind 

On the 29th Sir E. Grey, in a conversation with the Ger- 
man Ambassador, suggested that (here might still be a way 01 
1 king mediation more easily acceptable : Austria, as soon as 
had occupied part of Servian territory would slate "that 
she would not advance further, pending an effort of th I 
to mediate between bee and Russia" ( 

m • v. n., no 104. 

- '•' ' . it". B., the Kaiser's telegram, Pre*., p. 13. 

B. I 1 ( . ured Sir I'.. « trey i 

tin. | transmitted this propo J to Vi nna ai I had given il ipporl I 
f /■'. i -.. ao hall see how< il when m. • 

! form of it, 1 

:: ' nl \\ Inch 

mentions the i luence said to have bi nexei lonVi 



44 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

The folio wing day, July 3oth, the formula that M. Sazonoff 
had, the day before, submitted to Germany through Count de 
Pourtales and which the German Government had rejected, was 
communicated to Sir E. Grey (see above, p. 3g). It seemed to 
him that there was some similarity between this proposal and 
his own, and that with a little good will, M. Sazonoff's formula 
might be modified so as to correspond with the one he himself 
had thought of (i). M. Sazonoff agreed to made this change and 
proposed the following wording : "If Austria will consent to 
check the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if, 
recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has become a ques- 
tion of European interest, she will allow the great Powers to 
look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Servia could 
afford to the Government of Austria-Hungary without impairing 
her rights as a sovereign state and her independence — Russia 
will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude" (2). By pro- 
posing this formula M. Sazonoff made a new and difficult sacri- 
fice in the cause of peace, for, as, he recognised in it the fact of 
the invasion of Servia by Austrian troops, he seemed to admit 
the right of that invasion. 

England and France accepted without hesitation this new 
proposal. Should Austria in her turn give it her adherence, the 
ultimatum which had just been addressed to Russia would de- 
prived of its object. Germany would obtain satisfaction, for the 
Russian mobilisation would naturally be stopped as soon as 
Austria had consented to grant the concessions asked of her. 
Austria consented at once and informed Germany of the fact (3). 
She accepted the principe of mediation; she even agreed to dis- 
cuss " the substance of the Austrian ultimatum " sent to Servia 
on the 23rd (4). In the meantime she multiplied her pacific 
demonstrations. At Vienna Count Berchtold sent for the Russian 
Ambassador and "begged him to do his best to remove the 

(1) B. Cor., no 103. 

{2) 0. B., no 67. 

(3) B. Cor., no 135. 

(4) B. Cor., no 13J. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 45 

wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg"; it was wroi 
said he, to accuse Austria-Hungary " of having banged the 
door on all further conversations ". He had informed Paris ami 
London that " neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights 

nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated 
by Austria-Hungary " (i). Russia had never asked for more. 
Thus -when llerr von Schoen w r as made acquainted with these 
conversations and with their result, of which his Government 
had left him in ignorance, he could not help recognising that 
on the est Aug. in the morning there was in this " a glimmer 
of hope " (a). 

Probably, if he spoke, in spite of everything, with so much 
reserve, it was because the silence on the part of his Govern- 
ment regarding these important negotiations did not seem to 
him a very good omen. In fact, this formula, which all the 
other States found equitable, which even those the most 
directly concerned in the conflict had eagerly accepted, was 
set aside by Germany. In vain on the 1st Aug. the English 
Ambassador in Berlin did his best to show Herr von Jagow how 
what strange the situation was : the chief disp rile was between. 
Austria and Russia; Germany was only drawn in as Austria's 
ally; if. therefore, the two States interested were ready 
discuss matters, as was evident, it would be illogical for 
Germany to stand in the way of a peaceful solution, " unless 
she desired war on her own account" (3). Herr von Jagow would 
listen to nothing. Without doubt, said he, " hail not Russia 
ilised against Germany, all would have been well ". Now 
it was loo late. The German Government only saw one thing. 
A demand had been addressed to Russia; Russia must submit. 
As for the great ■ "ncessions made by Austria, Germany d 

take them into account, for, according I" Herr von Jagow, 
they were due i" Gen tfluence. How much it i-^ to be 

regretted tli.it the despatches have never been published which 

(\) n. Cor., no 137; O. B.. n» 7:i. 
(2) 3 DO 1 

( .:) D. Cor., no 138, 



45 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

are said to contain Germany's wise counsels to Vienna. But 
above all how surprising it is that Germany should have ad- 
vised such an exemplary moderation during the days from the 
29th July to 3ist July at the very time that she herself was tak- 
ing up a distinctly warlike attitude! Besides, whatever may have 
been the cause of Austria's wise decision, did not anxiety for 
the general interests of Europe and of civilisation demand that 
note should be taken of it at once, and that it should be used 
to the advantage of peace; especially, since at the same time the 
German Government was obtaining all that it asked for, the 
demobilisation of Prussia (1)? 

But at the very moment when this conversation took place, 
the German mobilisation was already decreed (Aug. 1st). 

The declaration of war against Russia. — There is now no 
further question of Servia and of the Serajevo crime, nor of 
Austria and her ultimatum. Germany and Russia stand alone 
face to face. 

The ultimatum expired at noon on the 1st Aug. Russia 
naturally judged it contrary to her dignity to reply within the 
time limit prescribed to such an arrogant injunction. Yet the 
Emperor Nicholas did not want war to be declared before he 
had made one last effort in favour of peace. Barely had the 
time allowed come loan end when, on the istof Aug. at. 2 p. m., 
he addressed the following telegram to the Emperor William : 
"' I can understand that you are obliged to mobilise; but I 
should like to have from you the same guarantee that I gave 
you (2), that these measures do not mean war and that we 
shall continue our negotiations for the welfare of our respec- 
tive countries and for general peace, so dear to our hearts. Our 
long and tried friendship ought, with God's help, to succeed 
in preventing bloodshed. This is my most earnest desire and 
I have entire confidence in your reply (3) ". This clearly indicated 

(1) No mention is made in the White Book of the Russian proposal, amended 
by England, nor of the Austrian concessions. 

(2) This guarantee had been given by the Czar in a telegram of the 31 st. 

(3) W. B., Pref., p. 13. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 47 

that he remained open to any plan of conciliation. But the 
sameday the Emperor William haughtily rejected this proposal. 
'• \n immediate reply", he telegraphed, "clear and unequi- 
vocal, from your Government is the only way to avert a most 
terrible calamity. Until I receive that reply it is impossible for 
me, to my great regret, to discuss the subject of your telegram ". 
The refusal was brutal. 

That very evening, at 7.10, war was officially declared against 
Russia by Germany. In the note to this effect, which Ilerr von 
Pourtales had caused to be delivered to M. Sazonoff, the only 
grievance mentioned was the refusal to reply to the German ulti- 
matum 1 1). It is curious to note that, when announcing it next 
day to Sir E. Goschen, Hcrr von Jagow thought fit to justify it 
otherwise (2). Russian troops were said to have crossed the 
frontier; it would therefore be Russia who, in point of fact had 
taken the initiative in the war. It goes without saying that this 
accusation, accompanied by no proof and totally ignored in the 
official note delivered toM. Sazonoff, was invented from begin- 
ning to end. The Austrian Government, however, made use of 
it when, five days later, it decided at last to follow the example 
of its ally and to declare war against Russia (3). It also main- 
tained that Russia had opened hostilities. The very diversity 
of the pretexts alleged suffices to prove that the cause deter- 
mining war was to be sought elsewhere. 

We may wonder how it was that the German Government 
which on the 29th July had postponed its ultimatum because 
it feared the intervention of England, three days later took no 
further account of it. YetEnglaml had not changed her attitude. 
On the contrary, on the 3oth July, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to 
K. (iusHi I) to confirm him in his opinion that the bargain 
proposed the day before by the Chancellor in exchange fos 
Great Britain's neutrality, " could not for a moment In- enter- 
tained. It would be", said he, "a disgrace for us to make this 

. mo :•-.. 
-., TO 1;;. 
,■) 0. U., no 



48 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace 
from which the good name of this country would never 
recover" (i). On the ist Aug., when Prince Lichnowsky 
again endeavoured to obtain formal assurances of neutrality 
by suggesting "that Germany might guarantee the integrity 
of France and her colonies", Sir E. Grey did not allow himself 
be tempted by this high bid and maintained his resolution to 
make no engagement (2). 

His words however were not taken literally. It was not 
believed that the English Government would recognise that it 
had at any rate moral obligations, towards France, but it Avas 
no doubt thought, that it merely wished to keep its hands free 
to act according to circumstances. And as Sir E. Grey repeated 
again and again that his attitude would depend above all on 
public opinion, an attempt was made to gain the latter. A 
serious denial of justice, an act oi aggression without any 
apparent reason, might move it. The declaration of war that 
was contemplated on the 29U1 July had evidently this character 
to declare war against Russia because she had mobilised against 
Austria, and that when Austria had no fault to find, was to own 
that war was wanted for war's sake. To break off, negotiations 
in these circumstances was a dangerous game to play. On the 
other hand, a general mobilisation on the part of Russia which, 
with a little skill, might be represented as directed deliberately 
againsl Germany, was a more plausible reason and was less 
likely to upset the pacific sentiments of England. And for this 
it was better to wait. Patience was all the easier as, from the 
3oth (3), it was not difficult to foresee the course that events 
were about to take, especially if they were helped on a little. 
The impending general mobilisation of Austria from which Herr 
von Tschirsky, though no doubt aware of it, did not attempt to 
dissuade the Austrian Government would necessarily force 

(1) B. Cor., no 101. 

(2) B. Cor., no 123. 

(3) On the roth Heir von Jagow announced that Austria was about to 
decide on a general mobilisation (F. B., no 109). 



! 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 

Russia to a corresponding measure. A belter occasion was there- 
fore at hand. 

The declaration of war against France. — What was Fiance 

going to do ? 

No one doubled that she would fulfil her duly towards her 
ally. But in order to make il clear to the world that il was Ger- 
main's firm resolution to make war against France, the French 
Government refrained from doing any thing that might resemble 
an act of hostility. When announcing to our Ambassadors that 
French mobilisation was ordered, M. Yiviani was careful to 
inform them that it constituted simply a measure of preserva- 
tion which would not prevent the Government from continuing 
the negotiations it had already begun (i). Moreover, to avoid 
any incident that Germany might be able to interprele as an act 
of \var, the French troops received orders, even after mobilisa- 
tion, to leave a zone of 10 kilometres between them and the 
frontier (a). 

But Germany could not wait. The plan of her General Staff 
was to throw itself immediately on France, to force her to sur- 
render within a few weeks' lime and then to turn back against 
Russia. It was therefore necessary to act swiftly. She waited 
however as long as she could, probably hoping that France 
would in the end take the initiative in the rupture and spare 
i the odium of aggression. Hut on the 3rd Aug. the ultima- 
tum addressed to Belgium expired, hostilities were about to 
in, and il was impossible to delay any longer; at 6-45 p. in., 
Herr von Schoen went to the Quai d'Orsay to ask tor his pass- 
ports and to declare war. 

It was not easy to find a reason for a declaration that was not 

tified by any direct conflict between the two countries. The 

ly allegation madewas that French aviators had committed 

acts of hostility on German territory. One of them was said to 

have attempted to destroy works near Wcscl, others to 1 1 . t ^ < - 

I . B., no I . 

i j }'. /;., mo i 

UBiai ai NM. — Ang. -" | 



50 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

been seen over the region of the Eifel,. another to have thrown 
bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. The very 
manner in which these accusations were made suffices to prove 
that they were trivial and poor inventions. No evidence was 
brought forward, no details given as to the exact spot where 
these acts had taken place; nothing was said as to their date, as 
to the manner in which they had been carried out or as to the 
nature and extent of the damage caused. All these incidents 
were presented as though they had happened apart from time 
and space, which is the est proof of their unreality (i). 

These inventions were all the more audacious because 
M. Viviani already on the 2nd Aug. had pointed out to the 
Government at Berlin distinctly warlike acts which had been com- 
mitted by German troops on French territory. They had crossed 
the frontier at Cirey as well as near Longwy ; they were mar- 
ching on the forts bearing the latter name (2). The customs 
post at Delle had twice been fired on by a detachment of German 

(1) As we wished to ascertain whether the German newspapers had given 
a more detailed account of these occurrences, we consulted five of the principal' 
newspapers {Vorwaerts, Arbiter Zeitung, of Vienna, Frankfurter Zeitung, 
Kcelnisehe Zeitung, Milnchner Neueste Nochrichten) from the end of July to- 
the 5th Aug. First of all we noticed that the aviator who is said to have 
flown over Karlsruhe is not mentioned. As for the others, the account of them. 
Is as vague as it is in the official note. These incidents, given as the cause 
determining war, take up one line, two or three at the most. Tfie bombs ue^er 
Uji any .race. One of these aeroplanes, that at Wesel, is said to have been 
brought down ; nothing is said of the aviator and, what became of him, nor is 
there 3 anything about the aeroplane itself. In a word, the Germans iook care to 
draw attention to their arrival in Germany and then never spoke of them 
again. They were never seen to return to their star Ling-point. 

°But we have still more convincing evidence. We have been able to procure 
a Nuremberg newspaper, the Frankischer Kurrier. On the 2nd Aug., the 
day the bombs are supposed to have been thrown, not a word is said about 
the incident. Nuremberg received the news on the 3rd by a telegram from 
Berlin identical to that published by the other newspapers. Again, the Kcel- 
nisehe Zeitung of the 3rd, in its morning edition, published a telegram from 
Munich which read as follows : "The Bavarian Minister of war is doubtful as 
to the exactness of the news announcing that aviators had been seen above 
the lines Nuremberg-Kitzingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach and that they had 
thrown bo.nbs on the railway." 

We have been greatly helped in these researches by our colleague J. Hada- 
mard ani M- Edg. Milhaud, professor at the University of Geneva, to whom, 
we tender our sincere thanks. 

(2) Y, B., no 136. 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 51 

soldiers. To the north of this place, two German patrols of Ihc 
5th Mounted Chasseurs had advanced as far as the villages o ( 
Jonchcry and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. 
The officer who commanded the former had blown out the 
brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry hid taken away 
the horses which the Mayor of Suarce was collecting and had 
forced the inhabitants of the Commune to lead them away (.1). 
This time the precise details given of the grievances made it 
possible to verify them (2). Besides, at the same moment, Luxem- 
bourg had already been invaded though : it is true that Herrvon 
Sehoen sent M. Viviani a note in which it was said that this 
invasion, contrary to the international treaties, did not constitute 
an aggressive action but was merely a preventive measure (3 . 

For reasons which we shall not seek to determine, Austria- 
Hungary did not feel called upon to proceed in the same way as 
her ally : she did not declare war against France. The result 
was paradoxical : the Austrian Ambassador remained our guest 
whilst Austrian troops were on our frontier. On the 10th Aug 
the French Government put an end to this paradox by recalling 
M. Dumaine; Herr von Sczesen then asked for his passports. 

But there was one member of the Triple Alliance who refused 
to side with Germany; this was Italy. From the beginning s-he 
had disapproved of the Austrian ultimatum. During the negotia- 
tions she had supported the efforts of the Triple Entente in 
favour of peace. In fact on the istof Aug. the Marquis di San 
Giuliano had warned the German Ambassador at Home that 
4 - the war undertaken... having an aggressive character, and not 
being in accordance with the purely defensive character of the 
Triple Alii m<<_\ Italy could not take part in the war " '1 . 

(t) )'. //., no I 

(2) The Chancellor in his speech bo the Reii I stag on the Uh Aug. main- 
tain^! that, according to the GFeneral Staff, one only of these violations of the 

tries had really bean commit ted. .More '• er, lie telle us neither fl 
when it took pli 

(3) r. a\, BO ' 

('.I )'. />., no \i,. Bban writim: tft< [taunt from .1 r 

speech of Mi Giol tii that al eady In 1913 \ u Lria wish tl a 

war against and that it.iiy bad refused bei eoi in sueh 

aggression. The Sarajevo assassinaii'm was therefore merely a prel 



V. — Conclusion. 

These facts being established, the question which forms the 
title of our book is answered. The facts speak for themselves; 
they clearly indicate who wanted war. 

It was evidently not France. Even her worst enemies have 
not brought such an accusation against her. In fact, she strain- 
ed every effort and until the last struggled for peace. 

It has been said (i), it is true, that she had never forgotten 
Alsace-Lorraine. But who would call it a crime in her to be 
faithful to the religion of remembrance? Such natural and legiti- 
mate sentiments could only be made a reproach to her had 
they revealed themselves by either aggressive or imprudent 
acts, of a nature to trouble the peace of Europe. But the out- 
ward attitude of France was always irreproachably correct. This 
was distinctly seen at the time of the painful incidents of 
Saverne. • 

It would also be as impossible to blame England. It was she 
who presided at all the attempts at conciliation; it was even 
she who most often renewed them. England's desire for peace 
was such that Sir E. Grey would not have hesitated to con- 
sider himself free from all obligation towards France and Russia 
had war broken out through the fault of these two countries. 
On the 3ist July, he telegraphed to Sir E. Goschen : li I said 
to the German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could 
get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear 
that German and Austria were striving to preserve European 
peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable it 
they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, 
and go the length of saying that if Russia and France icould not 

(1) This was said by the German Chancellor to the Reichstag on the 2nd 
Dec. 1914. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 53 

ept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to 
do with the consequences (i). 

In the preface to the White Book ilie German Government 
i _ iiisccl these pacific intentions of England. Since then, it is 
true, it has changed iLs mind. To-day the current opinion in 
Germany is that the responsibility of the war devolves on Eng- 
land. She is accused of having drawn Germany " into an am- 
buscade " (2), by unmasking her intentions at the eleventh 
hour; that is equivalent, said the Chancellor, to " striking from 
behind a man who is fighting for his life against two 
assailants " (3). But these violent protestations simply mean 
that the German Government did not expect to see England 
give her support to an invaded Belgium. Ilerr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg had been so lavish in offers and in making advances, 
he had taken so much trouble, especially from the 29th, to 
appear to be on good terms with England; he had so often 
assured her of his pacific sentiments, that he believed himself 
sure of British neutrality. Even in the note in which Germany 
declared war against Russia, this supposed understanding was 
mentioned; we find it said there that the Emperor William 
had undertaken to perform the office of mediator " in agree- 
ment with England ". Therefore the surprise and disappoint- 
ment "f the Chancellor were great, so great even that they 
were expressed ingenuously in words which will remain 
historical. 

And yet he had only himself to blame for he had been ihilv 
warned. More than once Sir E. Grey had repeated thai, if the 
war became general, he might be obliged to intervene, in par- 
ticular that, if Germany violate 1 the neutrality of Belgium, 
" it would he extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in 
England ". He had called the attention of the German Govern- 
ment to the '* very serious " nature "!' the warning he had 
given it; and meeting in anticipation the reproaches thai 

(1) U. Cor., no 111. 

["he 1 cpn i-n was used in the manifesto i>ul>lisheil by the '-' in; 
I 

3) D. Cor., no 160. 



54 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

addressed to him to-day, he had added that, after such clear 
explanations, he could not be accused in the future of having 
deceived Germany by using equivocal language (i). Unfortuna- 
tely German diplomacy is too often lacking in psychological 
intuition; it cannot divine what is passing in the souls of indi- 
viduals and of nations, it cannot comprehend the motives which 
lead them, especially when those motives are complex and deli- 
cate. The result is that it foresees wrongly what their conduct 
will be. To-day it seeks vengeance in groundless accusations 
for an error of which it alone is guilly (2). 

The altitude of Russia was not less pacific than that of Eng- 
land and of France. It is true that Russia could not consent 
to leave Servi'a to her fate. But with the reserve that she could 
not allow Servia's rights as a sovereign State nor her territory 
to be impaired, she showed herself ready to accept any transac- 
tion. She admitted that guarantees could be asked of the Servian 
Government, which, moreover did not refuse them. She even 
went so far in urging moderation as to refrain from taking any 
grave decision even after x\ustria had declared war against 
Servia. She joined in all attempts at conciliation, she proposed 
several herself, declaring beforehand that she would concur in 
any that should seem equitable to England and France. " I 
shall negotiate to the very end ", said M. Sazonoff one day, and 
he kept his word. Germany, it is true, has accused him of having 
decreed a general mobilisation on the 3ist, and on account 01 
this single act she has wished to make the Russian Government 
responsible for the war. She wilfully forgot that such a mea- 

(1) B. Cor., nos 123 and 101. 

(2) We say nothing about another accusation made against England by 
Herrvon Bethmann Hollweg namely that i is on her that the hidden res- 
ponsiLilit. of the war will fall because she could have prevented it by 
letting t be known directly in St. Petersburg " that she would not allow the 
conflict to take the proportions of a European war." In other words to 
assure peace England had only to contest Russia's right, to intervene, 
that is to adopt Germany's point of view which she considered unjustifiable. 
These words of the Chancellor are extraordinarily wsnting in perception. 
Besides, how could England have forced Russia to abstain if the latter 
refused to yield to her injunction ? Would it have been by seeking an alliance 
with Germany ? 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 

sure had been imposed on Russia by a similar measure (bat 
bad already been taken by Austria. Russia could not content 
liri -elf with opposing the few army corps she was mobilising 
against the millions of men that Austria was preparing for 
battle. Besides, we know that M. SazonofT offered to stop these 
preparations if Austria would pledge herself to do the same, and 
it is not Russia's fault if her proposal was disregarded. None 
of the Powers of the Triple Entente can therefore be incriminated. 

How heavy, on the contrary, is the responsibility of Austria ! 
It was she who brought about the cataclysm by addressing an 
ultimatum to Servia, intentionally unacceptable. Then, when 
the crisis took place, she forced it towards a violent issue by 
turning long a deaf ear to any proposed compromise. However 
we must note in her favour that, if she certainly desired war 
wilh Servia, still she did not seem to have S)ii, r ht a general 

nflagratioOi If for a while she showed herself unbending, it 
was with the conviction, cirefully maintained by Herr von 
Tschirsky, that Russia would stand aside, as she had in [gog 
alter the annexation of Herzegovina and Bosnia. However, when 
she discovered that she was mistaken and that Russia look the 
matter seriously, she at once changed her attitude. When Russia 
mobilised she became conciliatory. On the agth partial mobili- 
-i Lion was decreed; on the ,Hoth Count Berchlold modified his 
tone. The more the European war seemed to threaten, the m 
the Government a I Vienna became pacific. When at last it rea- 
lised what a terrible game it was playing, il tried to draw back. 
But ii was too late. Germany bad taken the reins into her own 

hand- and carried A u- 1 r i.i along wilh her. Austria was the vic- 
tim of the bluff to which she bad too easily lent herself, Ger- 
many, too, did nol speak the truth w hen she pretended Ihal the 
military preparations of Russia had prevented her from acting to 
an\ purpn seal Vienna. Ii was, on the contrary, al this verj mo- 
nt that Austria grero wiser and herself offered to mediate i). 

I) Another on of I id 1- 

! if Hi'- i by Ausli i 

manoeuvre in conjunction with G , In ' ■ - 



5G THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

But whatever decreases ine responsibility of Austria, increa- 
ses all the more that of Germany. 

It was Germany who, by promising her ally, whose designs 
she knew, her entire support, encouraged that ally to provoke 
Servia. It was she who, by approving unreservedly that provo- 
calory attitude, urged Austria to persist in it. 

When Russia, England, France and Italy asked that at least 
a short respite might be granted them to be able to deliberate 
on the question at issue, hoping tacitly that time and reflexion 
might exercise a soothing influence, it was Germany who, by 
refusing to join the other Powers, prevented the request from 
having any result. 

It was she who, whilst professing pacific sentiments, rendered 
nugatory the plan of Conference of the four Powers, yet propo- 
sed nothing that might take its place. 

It was she who, when informed of the proposal for direct 
conversations between Russia and Vienna, to which she could 
have no objection as it bound her in no way, refused to support 
it at Vienna, contenting herself with transmitting it, not with- 
out with evident ill-will. 

It was she who showed herself absolutely aggressive by 
threatening, from the 29th July, to throw herself upon Russia, 
though she recognised afterwards that the pretext she had given 
for doing so was untenable. 

It was she who, on the 3oth, without consulting Austria, 

to maintain that through her influence Austria had become conciliatory > 
that, consequently, peace was assured at the very moment that it was com- 
promised by the sudden mobilisation of Russia. 

This interpretation is not absolutely improbable. If we have left it on one 
side it is because such a manoeuvre would have been singularly coarse and 
unskilful. It did in fact turn against Germany. II made it possible to say, as 
we have done, that, Austria having gone over to the side of peace, this would 
have been assured, but for the final unbending attitude of Germany. How- 
over, the proceedings of the German diplomacy are sometimes so clumsy 
that the hypothesis cannot be considered as absolutely inadmissible. But 
were it true, though adding to the responsibility of Austria, it would also 
only increase that of Germany. What is more ignoble than this Machiavelism 
which would have consisted in sharing the roles of this most sinister comedy 
and of obliging Austria to pursue a course of lies so that she and her ally 
might attain more easily, the abominable aim they were pursuing? 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 57 

rejected a fresh proposal made by M. Sazonoff which could, at 
least, have served as a basis for eventual negotiations. 

It was she who, when a general mobilisation was decreed 
everywhere, when war seemed imminent, refused even to look 
into another proposal for compromise, which might have put 
off the danger, a proposal that Austria accepted, that all Ihe- 
Powers recommended and which ought lo have given entire- 
satisfaction to herself. 

Finally it was she who declared war against Russia and against 
France, justifying this double declaration by lying inventions. 

In answer to the concurrent wright of the overwhelming 
charges, Germany puts forward a case the official version of 
which is found in the Preface to the White Book ; its object is 
to throw the whole of the responsibility upon Russia. It will 
not take long to discuss this case; it crumbles away as soon as 
we are acquainted with the method lo which it ow r es its con- 
struction. 

Th ■ author of this preface does not falsify, in the literal sense 
of the word, the facts he makes use of; he makes methodu 
omissions. Indeed, we find in his account assertions without 
pi . others that are manifestly contrary to the truth; we 
have quoted several of them. Very often events are not dated 
and the order in which they are given is in no way chronolo- 
gical ; there results from this a confusion which renders 
verification difficult. Hut after all, though these mistakes and 
inexactitudes indicate a somewhat indifferent regard for truth, 
Btill ih's arc not essential. Bui though the facts are not 
outrageously altered, all that contradict the German thesis are 
carefully passed over in silence, or else they take up so little 
roo'u in the account that one barely notices them. To prove 
this, is only necessary to refer to the notes at the foot of the p 
ceding pages : we have pointed out these too clever Lapses of me- 
mory. We knew how man) were the attempts ;it conciliation to 
which Germany refused her aid. Novi in the White Book i 
document alone mentions a refusal of this kind no ra). The 
reader who possessed no other source of information would be 



58 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

ignorant of the steps taken by Russia, England and France to 
obtain an extension of the time-limit of the Austrian ultimatum 
and of the proposal of direct conversations between Vienna and 
■St. Petersburg (i). Barely a line or two is devoted to the propo- 
sal for a conference of the four Powers to which the Cabinets 
paid so much attention. Nor is anything said about the efforts 
made to urge Germany to state in what way she understood the 
mediation of the Powers, nor about the first German ultimatum, 
nor about the general mobilisation of Austria and its being an- 
terior to that of Russia, nor about the compromise finally accept- 
ed by Austria and rejected by Germany alone. Two groups ot 
facts alone are given and explained in detail; first, some docu- 
ments in which the German Government expresses, in very 
general terms, its desire for peace; then, all that bears on the 
military preparations of France and of Russia, and above all on 
the general mobilisation of the latter Power, but without giving 
any explanation of the causes which determined it. The very 
natural result is that it seems to have taken place quite sud- 
denly, without any kind of justification, at the very moment 
when the Emperor William was condescending to play the part 
of mediator. Represented in this light, that mobilisation appears 
an act of perfidy. To re-establish the truth it is only necessary 
to re-establish the facts systematically omitted. Then the per- 
sistence with which Germany set aside, one after the other, all 
possible means of maintaining peace, stands out clearly proved, 
and, at the same time Russia's act loses the aggressive character 
that it had been desired to impute to it and becomes a simple 
measure of self-defence. 

To sum up, there does not stand to the credit of Germany a 
single serious effort in favour of peace; there is nothing but 
words. On the contrary, all the acts which gradually turned 
the crisis towards war — the Austrian note, the refusal to pro- 
long the time limit, the declaration of war against Servia, the 
rejection of the proposed compromises, the first demand to 

(1) In the collection of documents there are two lines on this question 
(no 15). 



ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 59 

Russia, the ultimatum followed by the declaration of war — all 
tins was either directly desired by her or done with her support 
and complicity. At the beginning she was behind Austria, whose 
aggressive policy she supported ; then, when once she took mai- 
lers into her own hands, it was she who took, the supreme deci- 
sions and impose them on her ally, who was then hesitating and 
troubled. She therefore is the guilty one. 

It lias been objected that the Emperor William had shown by 
acts at different limes his desire for peace; his past, it is said. 
will not allow : us to ascribe to him bellicose intentions which 
his Avhole character belies. But this would be forgetting that 
men change with age and with circumstances. In fact there 
are grounds for believing that William II had changed, that 
towards the end of ioi3, the former champion of peace had 
begun to incline towards ideas of war. A conversation he had 
with the king of Belgium in the presence of General \on Mollke 
leaves this impression ; M. Cambon, who says he had it from 
an absolutely reliable source, repeals it in one of the documents 
in the ) ellow Book no G . The Emperor is represented as having 
said that he had "come to think that war with France was ine- 
vitable and that it must come sooner or later '', and General 
von Mollke is said to have spoken in the same terms. 

Vi iv different causes may have determined this moral revolu- 
tion The check of the imperial policy in Morocco, the unpopu- 
larity which resulted from it, the increasing popularity of the 
CrownPrince, this ail must have made William feel the necessity 
of raising his prestige by some bold stroke. On the other hand 
the nationalist agitation in Prance had been cleverly made use 

In the always powerful military party ; ii \\.i- said thai Prance 

nted and was preparing her revenge. Rinallj , Lhe Austro-IIun- 
m Empire was threatened with disintegration ;it lhe death 
of Francis Joseph ; if, therefore, German) wailed too long to act, 
it was to be feared that, al the important moment, she might 
find herself without an all) or with an all) weakened and enti- 
rely taken up with internal troubles. Thi I tendeni 
alrcauj very danj in themselves, became -till more p 



60 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

nouncecr m July 19 14, in consequence of a number or special 
circumstances. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand was a personal 
friend of William, besides being a fulure sovereign. For this- 
double reason the Kaiser felt himself especially called upon to 
avenge the Serajevo assassination. As- at the same time, England 
seemed threatened by a kind of civil war, Russia paralysed by 
very serious strikes, France by intestinal divisions, the occasion 
was propitious, and it might seem wise not to let it escape. 

Besides, the question is not whether William II Avas or was 
not a man to wish for war, but whether he and his Government 
did in fact wish for it. We have seen how facts answer this ques- 
tion. If, nevertheless, the German thesis on the causes of the war 
could obtain temporary credence, not only in Germany, but in a 
certain number of neutral countries, it was because the pro- 
cess by which it had been established could not immediately 
be seen through. The intentional omissions so numerous and 
so serious, which made it seem plausible, could not be revealed 
until it was possible to give a systematic account of the origin 
of the war. But now that we know in what order the events 
were linked together and what was at each phase of the nego- 
tiations the attitude of the different States that took part in 
them, the guilt of Germany stands out in strong relief. Every- 
thing proves it and nothing either weakens or attenuates it. 
Thus universal opinion hesitates less and less to ascribe to the 
German Government the responsibility for the terrible calamity 
which is causing so much suffering to all nations to-day. The 
truth is even beginning to filter through that kind of Chinese 
wall which isolates the German Empire to-day from the rest of 
the world. There are even now Germans who, although they are 
but very imperfectly enlightened, are troubled in their conscience 
and already feel the necessity of refusing to associate themselves 
with the great, the unpardonable falsehood, the history of which 
has just been related. No doubt, they are as yet only a little band. 
But how overwhelming must be the evidence of the facts to 
convince even these who only through cruel suffering can attain 
to a realisation of the truth. 



Additional Note. 

The preceding work was already in the press when the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the 21st December published a reply 
to the Yellow Book. It contested certain of the fact that are quoted 
in our study. We shall speak here only of those contentions which 
bear on the facts of some importance. 

1. The concessions made by Austria as from the oolh July 
are denied. Unfortunately the reality of these concessions was 
recognised by the German Government ilsclf. On the 1st Aug., 
when the English Ambassador pointed out to Herr von Jagow that 
Austria was now quite disposed to talk with Russia, the Secretary 
of Stale replied that this conciliatory disposition was due " to 

rman influence ". Whatever may have been the origin of this 
disposition it therefore certainly existed. 

2. A partial denial is given to Mr Cambon's despatch relating the 
conversation between King Albert and William II. The Emperor 
is said not to have been present at that interview. General von 
Mollkc alone was present and he did not use the terms attributed 
to him. In reply to this semi denial we confine ourselves to affirm- 
ing that the source from which Mr Cambon had his information is 
" perfectly reliable ". 

3 Finally, the German Gazette denies that the Austrian mobili- 
sation took place before the Russian general mobilisation; the first 
is said to have taken place during the day of the 3 1st . the second 
dating the night of the 3oth-3ist. lint >i) no proof of any kind is 
given in support of this assertion b) M. Paleologue's telegram dated 
tin- .'list ' >'. B., no 118) says expressly thni the Russian general mobi- 
lisation was determined by the Austrian general mobilisation. No 
lence to the contrary is given In support of this denial. -■ ["he 
writer of the article seems to have forgotten that, according to 
M. Dumaine (Y. D., no ii5) the Austrian general mobilisation took 
place on the 3 1st alone o'clock, which makes it improbable thai it 
ild ii tve i"-' 1 !) provoki d by the Russian mobilisation, if the latter 
took pace during the night of the 3oth-3xst. d) Finally, a confession 
made by Germany decides the point al issue. We have seen p. in 
that on Hi'- ."> \>\ .1 ul\. a 1 j p. in. Berlin time), William 1 1 senl a tele- 
gram to t!i sCzai in which there was no question of a Russian genera 1 



62 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

mobilisation. At that time, then, the Government at Berlin was 
ignorant of it. To begin -\vilh, this ignorance at such an advanced 
hour of the day is incomprehensible if the Russian decree for 
mobilisation took place the preceding night. What follows will 
take away all doubt if any can still remain. After having reproduced 
the text of the Emperor's telegram, the author of the Preface to 
the White Book (p. 12) adds : "This telegram had not yet arrived 
at its destination when the mobilisation of all the Russian forces 
already ordered this same day (31st July) in the morning (am 
Vormitlag) was being carried out". Vormitiag means the morning, 
and indeed rather the later part of the morning, about n o'clock, 
not the night of the 3oth 01st. The German Government therefore 
has given an answer in advance to its newspaper. 

This fact established, we must add that the importance attached by 
Germany to the question of Russian mobilisation is simply and 
purely pharisaical. Even had that mobilisation not taken place 
Germany would have mobilised that day and Avar would have 
been the result. We have seen in fact how threatening was 
William II's telegram written at two o'clock in the afternoon, 
though at that time he was ignorant of the Russian mobilisation. 
And similarly in the morning, the Chancellor announced to the 
English Ambassador that " serious measures" were going to be 
taken against Russia, "perhaps to-day " (B . Cor,, no 10S, 109). 
And yet he only knew later that Russia was mobilising (B. Cor., 
no 112). — They were therefore searching for a pretext; the 
Russian mobilisation simply strengthened the one they already 
had in view. 



N 



CONTENTS 



Preface 1 

I. The Austrian Ultimatum and the Servia's Reply. 

(July 23 rd — 25 th ) 

The bellicose nature of the Austrian Ultimatum. 7 

The Ultimatum was known to Germany to 

The Attitude of the Powers. The first attempts at reconci- 
liation repulsed by Germany and Austria \3 

The Servian Reply 1.6 

II. The Diplomatic Rupture and the Declaration of War against 
Servia. 

(July 25^ — 28*) 

A singular step on the part of Germany 21 

Two further attempts at conciliation repulsed by Germany 
and Austria 22 

III. The First ultimatum of Germany to Russia. 

(July 29th _ 30' 

The Triple Entente and Italy continue the negotiations. 

The evasive altitude of Germany 29 

The first ultimatum of Germany to Russia 31 

A further pacific pr >posal on the part of Russia rejected by 
Germany 38 

IV. The Declaration of War against Russia and against France. 

July 3|K — Aujj. 3 rd ) 

The second ultimatum of Germany to Russia Jo 

A new formula of compr cepted by Austria, rejected 
1 . ( lermany . 

The Declaration of war againsl Russia 

The Declaration of war against France 

V. Conclusion. 

Conclusion 

Additio.nai. Notb 61 



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